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APPELLATE PROCEDUREt
PAUL D. BARNS* AND BRUCE ALEXANDER**
INTRODUCTION
As early as 1906, one judicial scholar observed: "Judicial power
may be wasted ... by consuming the time of courts with points of pure
practice, when they ought to be investigating substantial controver-
sies .. . ." The judicial power of the Florida appellate courts does not
escape this waste. An examination of one randomly selected Southern
Reporter2 reveals that: of the twenty-two supreme court decisions ap-
pearing therein four (18.1%) were decided upon a pure point of practice,
and twenty-three out of one hundred and eight (12.3%) district court
decisions met a similar fate. One writer urges members of the Bar to
"Read the Rules" when dealing with civil procedure." That credo applies
with equal force to the practice in the appellate courts.
The discipline of appellate procedure in general does not readily
lend itself to systematic organization. For the most part the outlines
utilized in the two standard works on "Appeal and Error"-Ruling Case
Law and American Jurisprudence-form the skeleton framework for this
survey. There are, however, topics treated in this paper which are not
to be found elsewhere: Affect of Appeal upon Civil Procedure Rule
1.38 (b) Relief and Procedural Aspects of Criminal Procedure Rule No. I.
Also considered for the first time are Motions for New Trial and Petitions
for Rehearing Made in the Lower Court: Their Effect Upon Obtaining
Review; Doctrine-"Law of the Case"; and Appellate Court's Power
Over the Cause.
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I. SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES
The Florida Appellate Rules4 govern all proceedings in the supreme
court, district courts of appeal, and the circuit courts when these courts
exercise their appellate jurisdiction. These Rules are promulgated pur-
suant to constitutional and inherent powers of the Florida Supreme
Court.5 Effective midnight, September 30, 1962, they supersede all con-
flicting rules and statutes. Those statutes not superseded remain in
effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.' Only the supreme
court can nullify a Rule-trial courts are without such authority.'
The superseding clause of Rule 1.4 was applied in A.N.E. v. State,
8
after the court concluded that section 39.14 of the Florida Statutes was
in conflict with the Rules.' That statute provided that "no briefs or papers
other than the juvenile court file need be filed in the district court of
appeal unless the said court shall specially so direct. °10 The broad question
involved in A.N.E. was whether the Florida Appellate Rules were appli-
cable to appeals taken from juvenile courts. The appellants, in their
appeal from the juvenile court, timely filed their notice of appeal but
failed to file their assignments of error, directions to the clerk, the record-
on-appeal and their briefs, as required by the Rules. After a determination
that the statute in question was superseded by the Rules promulgated
in 1957 and revised in 1962, the court concluded that appeals from
orders entered in juvenile court are governed by the Rules.
4. FLA. APP. R. 1.2 provides that the correct citation for the rules is "Florida Appellate
Rules, 1962 Revision." Throughout this paper they will be referred to as "the Rules."
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
6. See FLA. APP. R. 1.4 governing effective date and repeal.
7. In Ser-Nestler, Inc. v. Generai Fin. Loan Co., 167 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), the
supreme court in dicta stated that a trial court is without authority to nullify FLA. R. Civ. P.
2.12(b) since "the Supreme Court is vested with the sole authority to promulgate, rescind and
modify the rules, and until the rules are changed by the source of authority, they remain
inviolate." This statement is equally true concerning the appellate rules which are also
promulgated by the supreme court.
8. 167 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
9. It was noted in the decision that no appellate court had previously held the statute in
question to be in conflict with the Florida Appellate Rules.




The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, district courts of
appeal, and circuit courts is prescribed in article V of the state consti-
tution. As usual, no other area of judicial review causes as much trouble
to practitioners as does the question-in which court is review appro-
priate?
In regard to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, con-
fusion invariably centers around that provision of section 4(2) pro-
viding for appeals to the supreme court as a matter of right from decisions
of the district courts of appeal which initially pass upon the validity of a
state statute. Typically, a suit is commenced in the circuit court involving
constitutional issues and is then appealed to the district court of appeal.
When review by the supreme court is sought, the question arises-which
of the two lower courts initially passed upon the validity of the statute?
If the circuit court was the first court to do so, then the supreme court
lacks jurisdiction, except perhaps by certiorari. It is only when the
district court of appeal initially passed upon the validity of the statute
than an appeal from that decision may be taken to the supreme court.
The complexity of the problem is attested to by Tyson v. Lanier."
Petitioners had filed a complaint in the circuit court praying for a
mandatory injunction requiring the respondent to re-assess their lands.
The injunction was granted on the ground that the taxing authorities had
disregarded and failed to comply with the provisions of the controlling
statute. The chancellor found that no constitutional question was in-
volved. On appeal to the district court the chancellor was reversed, the
majority of the court having found that the chancellor's interpretation
of the act was of doubtful constitutionality. Judge White in his dissent
stated that "despite protests to the contrary, the majority interpretation
of the act is composed squarely in constitutional perspective because
there are constitutional aspects that cannot be-avoided."' 2 On appeal the
supreme court apparently determined that it was the district court which
had initially passed upon the constitutional question because it assumed
jurisdiction.
Final decrees rendered by trial courts which pass directly upon the
validity of a state statute may be appealed directly to the supreme court.'"
The jurisdiction of the supreme court is, however, limited to review of
that portion of the decree which affects the constitutional validity of the
statute. 4 If, prior to argument on appeal, the appellant withdraws his
11. 156 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
12. Lanier v. Tyson, 147 So.2d 365, 377 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
13. See the first sentence of FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2).
14. This limitation was restated in McNevin v. Baker, 170 So.2d 66 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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contentions relating to the unconstitutionality of the statute, the supreme
court is deprived of its jurisdiction, and the proper reviewing court
becomes the district court of appeal. 5
B. District Courts of Appeal
To a limited degree, the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts
of appeal is interrelated with the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
courts and the supreme court. All final judgments or decrees rendered
by trial courts may be appealed as a matter of right to district courts of
appeal, unless the final judgment or decree can otherwise be appealed
directly to the supreme court or to a circuit court." Accordingly, whether
any particular cause can be appealed as a matter of right to the appro-
priate district court of appeal is determined by whether the cause is of
the type that may be directly appealed to the supreme court or to a
circuit court.
In most instances a reading of sections 4(2)" 7 and 6(3)8 of the
state constitution will reveal whether an appeal can be taken to the
district courts of appeal. There are, however, exceptional cases where
the answer does not lie in the bare words of the constitution, rather resort
must be made to case analysis. The decisions which follow are instances
wherein jurisdiction could not have been predicted from a mere reading
of the pertinent sections of the constitution.
In Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay. Control Authority,9
the second district was confronted with an appeal taken from a circuit
court. Constitutional issues were raised by the appellants in the lower
court, but that court determined that the appellants "had estopped them-
selves from urging unconstitutionality of the acts under which they were
at the same time seeking relief."2 ° The ruling that estoppel was appli-
cable was, according to the district court, erroneous. The district court
considered the merits of the constitutional issue which the appellants
attempted to argue in the circuit court "in the interests of obviating the
more protracted and expensive method of remanding for further pro-
ceedings.1121 In theory, had the circuit court initially ruled upon the con-
stitutional issue or had the cause been remanded by the district court for a
ruling thereon, the appeal could have been taken directly to the supreme
court and accordingly the appellants would not have had an absolute
15. Grove Press, Inc. v. State, 152 So.2d 177 continued at 156 So.2d 537 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
16. See the first paragraph of FLA. CoNST. art. V, § 5(3).
17. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) pertains to what matters may be appealed from trial
courts to the supreme court.
18. This section governs appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
19. 154 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
20. Id. at 182 and 183.
21. Id. at 186.
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right to obtain review by the district court.22 This did not occur, however,
and the appeal was evidently considered by the district court as one that
could be taken as a matter of right. In short, the Zabel decision may be
cited for the proposition that unless the trial court actually rules upon the
constitutional issue, an appeal to the district court of appeal can be taken
as a matter of right. Furthermore' it is not material to the validity of this
proposition that the trial court's failure to decide upon the constitutional
issue was due to a misapplication of substantive law.
According to the provisions of section 6(3) of the constitution, final
judgments entered in landlord and tenant proceedings are appealable to
the circuit courts when the judgment is rendered by one of the courts
enumerated in that section; accordingly an appeal therefrom cannot
be prosecuted to the district court of appeal. When, however, the judg-
ment is rendered by a civil or criminal court of record, the appeal may be
taken to the appropriate district court of appeal.28
Appellate jurisdiction from a felony conviction entered in a criminal
court of record is in the district courts,24 and the circuit courts have final
appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the criminal court of record when
the appeal is taken from a misdemeanor." This distinction raised an
important problem in Wells v. State.2" The appellants, convicted on sep-
arate counts--one a felony and the other a misdemeanor-appealed
both convictions to a district court of appeal. In keeping with the
distinction, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the misdemeanor
conviction. 2 The question then arose as to what disposition was to be
made of such appeals. Although it was clear that the district court of
appeal had jurisdiction to proceed with the felony count, there was ap-
parent disharmony as to whether the district court could on its own
initiative, or, for that matter, on the motion of either party, transfer the
misdemeanor conviction to the appropriate circuit court pursuant to
Rule 2.1 (a) (5) (d).2" In Wells, the third district simply dismissed that
22. This result would obtain from a reading of § 5(3) art. V in pan materia with § 4(2).
The latter section provides:
Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the Supreme Court, as a matter
of right. . . from final judgments or decrees passing directly upon the validity of a
state statute....
23. Floyd v. Clark, 173 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1965).
24. Buchanan v. State, 171 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (implication).
25. FM. CONST. art. V, § 6(3).
26. 168 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
27. The result reached in Wells v. State also obtained in Christian v. State, 176 So.2d
561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
28. This Rule provides:
When the jurisdiction of an appellate court has been improvidently invoked, that
court may of its own motion or on motion of either party to the cause enter an
order transferring it to the court having jurisdiction. Five days' notice of such
motion or proposed action shall be given to the other parties. Notices of appeal and
other papers filed prior to the transfer shall have the same force and effect as if
filed in the proper court and as of the time when filed in the court from which the
transfer was made.
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part of the appeal which was improvident. Subsequently, however, the
majority of that court in Christian v. State,29 sua sponte transferred the
misdemeanor count to the appropriate circuit court and cited Rule
2.1 (a) (5) (d) as sanctioning this procedure. One judge disagreed, how-
ever, with the majority's use of the Rule under these circumstances because
"the approval of such loose practice will permit an appeal of two con-
victions by one notice of appeal."3° Indeed it is doubtful whether the
supreme court will sanction the use of the Rule to accomplish such partial
transfers. Christian nonetheless presently stands as precedent for such
a practice, at least by the third district.
The rule itself does not mention partial transfers; on the contrary
it stipulates that a "court may of its own motion or on motion of either
party to the cause enter an order transferring it to the court having
jurisdiction."8' Furthermore, since a single notice of appeal has been
held ineffective to bring two separate informations up for review," the
supreme court may view the procedure employed in Christian as per-
nitting an appellate court to do indirectly what the appellant cannot
do directly. Practitioners are therefore cautioned to exercise care when
considering the use of Rule 2.1 (a) (5) (d) under the Wells and Christian
facts.
In Dresner v. City of Tallahassee,3 petitioners were tried and con-
victed in a municipal court for violating a local ordinance which pro-
hibited certain forms of assembly. The subject matter ultimately pre-
sented for review concerned the federal constitutionality of the ordinance.
Initially the convictions were appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,
but that court determined appellate jurisdiction was absent and there-
fore transferred the appeal to the appropriate circuit court. 4 The circuit
court affirmed the municipal court's decision. Petitioners then applied
for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. In so doing,
it should be noted, they attempted to by-pass the Florida District Court
of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court. This procedural move by the
petitioners gave rise to the following certified question:
On a timely petition for writ of certiorari or other process, does
the Florida District Court of Appeal or any other court of
Florida have jurisdiction to review a judgment of the Circuit
29. Supra note 27.
30. Supra note 27 at 562. (Judge Tillman concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. FLA. App. R. 2.1(a) (5) (d). (Emphasis supplied.)
32. See Wilcox v. State, 171 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
33. 164 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1964).
34. By transferring the appeal an important principle was inferentially established, viz.,
in spite of the fact that a municipal court construes a controlling provision of the federal
constitution, final appellate jurisdiction is in the circuit courts. Thus, where a trial court
does construe a controlling provision of the federal constitution and the trial court is a
municipal court or perhaps any one of the courts enumerated in section 6(3), article V of the
state constitution, the appeal can only be prosecuted to the appropriate circuit court.
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Court affirming a conviction in the Municipal Court of a viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance'which incorporates a state stat-
ute by reference, where the questions presented for review con-
cern the federal constitutionality of the ordinance on its face
and as applied?"5
In answering this question, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
conviction was subject to review by the appropriate district court of
appeal by petition for a so-called common law writ of certiorari. It
appears, therefore, that where appeal is taken to a circuit court, from a
municipal court, the Dresner holding is that there will be no further
appeal from the appellate decision of the circuit court if that decision
construes a controlling provision of the federal constitution. Section 6(3)
of article V of the Florida Constitution, therefore, precludes the possi-
bility suggested by section 4(2); of direct appeal of the municipal
court judgment to the supreme court, or of the circuit court's appellate
decision to the appropriate district court of appeal.
The absence of a constitutional provision providing that one district
court of appeal can review decisions of another district court of appeal,
precluded the first district from granting a petition for writ of habeas
corpus where the effect was to bring a decision of the second district
court of appeal up for review.36
If an appeal is one that may be taken as a matter of right, consent
of the judge who issued the order which is appealed need not be obtained.
This principle was recently applied37 to render provisions of section
79.1138 of the Florida Statutes inapplicable when applied to appeals taken
from final judgments rendered in habeas corpus proceedings at the trial
court level. Since section 5(3), article V of the state constitution states
that such appeals may be taken "as a matter of right," section 79.11 was
superseded by both the constitution and the Florida Appellate Rules.39
C. Circuit Courts
Relatively few decisions involving the appellate jurisdiction of the
circuit courts were encountered during the period surveyed. Only two
decisions appear worthy of note.
35. Id. at 210.
36. Ryan v. Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, 171 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
37. State v. Michell, 170 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1964).
38. FiA. STAT. § 79.11 (1963) provides:
The judge hearing the cause, or a justice of the supreme court, shall grant to any
party or persons aggrieved by the judgment, including the state or any officer thereof,
or any political subdivision of the state, an appeal in accordance with the Florida
appellate rules.
39. It is worth while to note that "Section 79.11 . . .has been fully superseded by
Sections 4(2) and 5(3), Article V of the Constitution, and Florida Appellate Rules .
Supra note 32 at 291.
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In Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. State,40 it was observed
that a circuit court does not have appellate jurisdiction over civil courts
of record. An action for a deficiency decree was filed in the civil court
of record by a mortgagee who had previously prevailed in a separate suit
for foreclosure brought in a circuit court. No deficiency decree was
prayed for in the prior foreclosure proceedings. The mortgagor, after
the suit in the civil court of record was commenced, filed a petition for
writ of prohibition in the original foreclosure proceedings which was
granted on the ground that the civil court of record was acting outside
of its jurisdiction. On appeal the writ was quashed for lack of jurisdiction
to sustain the issuance of the writ. As noted on appeal, had the final
decree of foreclosure reserved jurisdiction, then the writ possibly could
have been sustained on the ground that it was necessary to the exercise
of jurisdiction of the circuit court. But such was not the case since the
complaint in foreclosure did not pray for a deficiency decree.
The second noteworthy decision involved the principle that a state
court, after removal of an action to a federal district court, is without
jurisdiction to act in the suit."' After the state circuit court appointed a
receiver, the action was removed to a federal district court which relieved
the receiver of any further responsibility other than to account. Prior to
his discharge the receiver died. An intervenor in the federal court moved
for the appointment of a successor-receiver, which motion was denied.
The intervenor, on the following day, applied in the circuit court for the
appointment of a successor-receiver. From the circuit court order making
the appointment, the defendant appealed. On appeal the order was
quashed.
D. Appeals-Plenary and Interlocutory
At law interlocutory appeals may be taken from orders relating
to venue or jurisdiction over the person or from post decretal orders,
except those relating to motions for new trial or reconsideration. All
orders or decrees entered in chancery, including post decretal orders,
but excluding those relating to motions for new trial or reconsideration,
may be reviewed by an interlocutory appeal.42 Of course, plenary ap-
peals, whether the action be legal or equitable in nature, can only be
taken from final rulings of the lower court.
The wording of Florida Appellate Rule 4.2 raises an interesting
problem, not yet considered by our appellate courts, regarding the ap-
pealability of an order granting a new trial. Section 59.04 of the Florida
Statutes provides that "upon the entry of an order granting a new trial,
40. 155 So.2d 393 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
41. Rutas Aereas Nacionales v. Cauley & Martin, Inc., 160 So.2d 168 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964).
42. See FLA. App. R. 4.2(a).
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the party aggrieved may, without waiting for final judgment, prosecute
an appeal . . . " However, Rule 4.2(a) excepts motions for new trials
from those orders, judgments or decrees entered in law or equity after
final judgment which may be reviewed by interlocutory appeal. Rule 1.4
unequivocally provides that "these rules shall supersede all conflicting
rules and statutes." Query: was section 59.04 superseded by the rules?
In Zabawczuk v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.,4" the defendants and
the plaintiff took plenary appeals in a pending personal injury action.
In support of his motion to dismiss defendant's appeal, the plaintiff con-
tended that a post decretal order granting defendant a new trial solely
on the issue of damages had the effect of making both prior judgments
interlocutory orders at law. The appellate court held that the argument
was meritorious. Since "such an interlocutory order at law does not relate
to a subject that will permit an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule
4.2,"" the appeal had to be dismissed. Implicit in the holding is the
rule that an order granting a motion for new trial solely on the issue of
damages will destroy the finality of the judgment entered. Orders en-
tered subsequent to a judgment granting a new trial on all issues are
held without exception to have such an effect. However, very few deci-
sions have been encountered where an order granting a new trial only on
the issue of damages was held to preclude a plenary appeal from the
judgment.
Orders entered at law dismissing a complaint as to some but not all
the defendants are ordinarily, according to most authorities, considered
non-final orders as to the parties dismissed and accordingly are review-
able only by full appeal after final judgment has been rendered. However,
such orders may be reviewed by interlocutory appeal where the scope of
those orders would ordinarily establish a basis for review by interloc-
utory appeal. Thus, in Paradis v. Cicero,45 review by interlocutory appeal
was held permissible where the trial court dismissed the complaint as
to a co-defendant for failure of plaintiff to give timely notice under the
constructive service statute. The question on appeal was treated as one
"relating to jurisdiction over the person" and for this reason it brought
the order of dismissal within the provisions of the ordinary rules sanc-
tioning interlocutory appeals.
An important problem created by the overlapping provisions of
section 4(2) of article V of the Florida Constitution and Rule 4.2 was
resolved during the period surveyed. Stated in the abstract the problem
is as follows: Where an order is entered in chancery which is interloc-
utory in nature, but which also decides a constitutional issue, should the
aggrieved party petition the supreme court for certiorari, or is an inter-
43. 168 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
44. Id. at 151.
45. 167 So.2d 248 (Fa. 2d Dist. 1964).
1965]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
locutory appeal the appropriate method of review? The confusion stems
from the constitutional provision: "the supreme court may directly
review by certiorari interlocutory orders or decrees passing upon chancery
matters which upon a final decree would be directly appealable to
the supreme court." On the other hand, Rule 4.2 sanctions interlocutory
appeals from equity decrees. In Gulf Fertilizer v. Walden,4" this confusion
was resolved in favor of review by interlocutory appeal. It should be
noted, however, that in practical effect there is little if any difference
in the scope of review afforded by an interlocutory appeal and review
by certiorari pursuant to article V, section 4(2).
Only one decision47 was reported during the period surveyed that
dealt with the nature of post decretal orders. An appeal was prosecuted
from a chancery order denying a deficiency decree pursuant to Rule 3.2.
Notwithstanding the fact that the lower court held that its denial was
without prejudice to proceed at law, the appellate court held that the
order was final and therefore considered the plenary appeal proper. The
court recognized that it is often difficult to determine whether a post
decretal order is final or interlocutory in nature. It was suggested that
in case of doubt, the better practice would be to follow the procedure
relating to interlocutory appeals outlined under Rule 4.2.
Orders denying motions to dismiss complaints are non-final in nature.
Accordingly, a plenary appeal will not succeed. Nor can such orders in
actions at law be reviewed by interlocutory appeal unless the grounds
upon which the motion was made relate to venue or jurisdiction over the
person. The appellant in State Road Dep't v. Brill,48 apparently argued,
in support of his interlocutory appeal from an order denying his motion
to dismiss, that his immunity from suit afforded by virtue of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity related to jurisdiction over the person. The ap-
pellate court rejected this contention and dismissed the appeal.
1. SAVINGS CLAUSES
Improvidently taken appeals may be considered by an appellate
court as petitions for certiorari under section 59.45 of the Florida
Statutes.4" Thus, appeals taken at law from interlocutory orders which
do not relate to venue or jurisdiction over the person and which were not
entered after final judgment will not necessarily be dismissed.5° How-
46. 163 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1964).
47. Burton v. Sanders, 170 So.2d 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
48. 171 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
49. FLA. STAT. § 59.45 (1963) provides:
If an appeal be improvidently taken where the remedy might have been more prop-
erly sought by certiorari, this alone shall not be a ground for dismissal; but the
notice of appeal and the record thereon shall be regarded and acted on as a peti-
tion for certiorari duly presented to the supreme court.
50. In Fennell v. Trailways, 169 So.2d 858 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), an improvident plenary
appeal taken from an interlocutory order was treated as a petition for certiorari.
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ever, there is no provision for the converse-that an improvident petition
for certiorari will be treated as an appeal."'
Florida appellate courts can, in the exercise of their discretion,
treat improvident plenary appeals as interlocutory. The operation of this
principle was illustrated in Washington Security Co. v. Tracy's Plumbing
& Pumps,52 wherein the appellant took a plenary appeal from a chancery
order which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint "with
leave to amend." Since the order appealed had neither dismissed the
cause nor set a time limit within which appellant was to amend, it was
not a final order but rather interlocutory. The court, in its discretion,
considered the appeal as if it had been commenced as an interlocutory
appeal."3
It should be noted that an appellate court can consider an improv-
ident plenary appeal as an interlocutory appeal only if an interlocutory
appeal would lie from the order, judgment, decision or decree from which
appeal is taken. 4
III. REVIEWABLE DECISIONS
A. General Principles
Appellate review, except where the rules or law sanction petitions for
certiorari, shall be by appeal.5 It is generally recognized that only judg-
ments, orders, decisions or decrees final in nature are reviewable by
plenary appeal. Decisions have appeared during the period surveyed
which set forth general principles which establish guide lines as to what
constitutes finality.
If the order appealed renders further judicial labor in the lower
court unnecessary, the order is generally considered final. Several recent
51. In Schneider v. Manheimer, 170 So.2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) petitioner sought
review by certiorari of a final summary judgment granted in favor of one of several de-
fendants. The court considered Florida Statute § 59.45 and concluded an improvident peti-
tion for certiorari may not be treated as an appeal.
52. 166 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
53. The reasons were as follows: (1) progress of the case in the lower court did not go
beyond the complaint and therefore the appellate court would have the very same appeal
papers before it under either type of appeal, (2) "dismissal of [the] appeal would occasion
only expense and delay inasmuch as plaintiff would merely be required to obtain a final
decree and file another notice of appeal in accordance with Rule 3.2, FA.R." Id. at 683.
54. Invariably, orders or decrees entered in chancery will meet this requirement since
the Rules expressly provide that "appeals [may be taken] to the appropriate court from
interlocutory orders or decrees in equity . .. ." FLA. App. R. 4.2(a). Rarely, however, will this
requirement be met when the appeal is taken from an order entered at law, since interlocutory
appeals from orders at law may be taken only when the order relates to venue or jurisdic-
tion over the person or when it is entered after final judgment. However, if the order entered
after final judgment relates to a motion for a new trial or a motion for reconsideration, an
interlocutory appeal is not sanctioned. Most decisions that have considered the propriety
of an appellate court treating an improvident interlocutory appeal as plenary, have flatly
renounced such a procedure. See Finneran v. Finneran, 137 So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
55. FrA. App. R. 3.1.
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cases have involved the question of the stage at which the trial court's
judicial labor ends. It has been held that an order denying appellant's
motion to strike an objection filed to his claim obviated further judicial
labor since the denial of the motion to strike resolved the appellant's
claim against the estate." In Smoak v. Graham," review by conflict
certiorari was sought from a district court's determination that an order
which both denied a petition for the payment of a claim in probate and
required that an independent suit at law be brought was a final order.
The supreme court noted the previously established Florida rule that
an order is not final when it permits extension of time under section
733.18 of the Florida Statutes,5" and held that the instant order was
appealable. The rationale of the court was predicated upon the fact that
"the judicial labor of the probate court is complete, for purposes of
review of a ruling under § 733.18(2), at the point when recourse to suit
in another court.., is required as a condition to any further consideration
of the claim in probate. '59
A second criteria that is used to determine whether a particular
order is final in nature was employed in In re Sager's Estate."' The order
appealed from required the filing of an inventory of assets in two estates
and provided that all interested parties would have thirty days after
that filing within which to file their objections to the accounting. Until
the thirty day period expired, the order could not be considered final.
Accordingly, if an order by its terms reveals that the court retains
jurisdiction, the order is not final for purposes of appeal.
An order which does not conclusively determine a particular ques-
tion adversely to the appellant is, according to general principles, not a
final order. Thus, when the county judge entered an order setting aside
letters of administration, and permitted the filing of a claim against
the deceased's estate, the personal representative of the estate could
not appeal therefrom."1 Since the claim could be objected to at a later
time and the question thereafter settled, the order was not finally deter-
minative of the claimant's rights against the estate.
Of course, orders lacking the requisite language of finality are not
final in nature, but rather interlocutory. In Altiere v. Atlantic Nat'l
Bank,62 the absence of words of finality prevented a plenary appeal from
56. Epperson v. Rupp, 157 So.2d 537 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). In In re Hamlin's Estate,
157 So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), the same result was reached where the lower court
entered an order denying a claimant's petition requesting the administration of the estate
to pay the claim.
57. 167 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1964).
58. This statute governs payment of and objection to claims filed in decedent's estates.
59. Id. at 561.
60. 171 So.2d 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
61. Tyler v. Huggins, 175 So.2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
62. 155 So.2d 386 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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an order adjudging ".... that defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint be and the same is hereby granted."
B. Nonsuits6"
1. NOMENCLATURE
At early common law, nonsuits were classified as either voluntary
or involuntary and the two were distinguished on the basis of who
sought the nonsuit?64 If the nonsuit was procured by the plaintiff at
his own insistence, it was voluntary in nature and it mattered not why
the plaintiff insisted on being nonsuited. Involuntary nonsuit was a term
the common law limited to nonsuits "ordered against a defaulting party-
plaintiff who has not affirmatively sought it."65 As used by most Florida
appellate courts, the terms voluntary and involuntary nonsuits have
taken on a different connotation. Unlike their early common law
predecessor, involuntary nonsuits have been referred to as those sought
by a plaintiff because of an adverse ruling made at trial. Motive became
the established criterion in all but a few Florida decisions. Before any
discussion is devoted to nonsuit problems the reader should take
cognizance of the fact that subsequent discussion will utilize the no-
menclature that obtained at common law.
2. HISTORY
Florida common law recognized the practice of nonsuits but from
an early date the legislative and judicial process have continually limited
its operative scope. The first restriction to which the common law non-
suit was subjected occurred in 1828 when the legislature declared: "No
plaintiff shall take a non-suit on trial unless he do so before the jury
retire from the bar."66 While this statute tacitly recognized that nonsuit
practice was embedded in Florida law, it restricted its use by a plaintiff
to the point in time prior to the jury's return of a verdict. Nonsuit practice,
as limited by the statute of 1828, continued unchallenged and unques-
tioned until 1962. In that year amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure failed to refer to nonsuits as found in the prior Rules. 7 This
omission gave rise to the plethora of cases attempting to correctly enun-
ciate the exact status of the nonsuit. Until July 1, 1965, the appellate
courts of this state had for the most part acceded to the view that non-
63. For a recent article on nonsuits, see Note, Whither Nonsuit?, 20 U. MIAMa L. REV.
204 (1965).
64. See Peaslee v. Mickaski, 167 So.2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
65. Id. at 244.
66. Currently, FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1963).
67. Deleted from the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was the phrase "nothing stated
herein shall preclude a nonsuit from being taken pursuant to any applicable statute." The
statute referred to was section 54.09. For prior treatment, see Barns and Mattis, 1962 Amend-
ments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. MiwaCi L. REV. 276, 281 (1963).
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suits were a procedural device which plaintiffs, and theoretically68 de-
fendants, could utilize. However, its use was not unrestricted. Where the
nonsuit was sought after the adverse party either answered or moved
for summary judgment, an order of court had to be obtained, and
it was thus grantable only upon such terms and conditions as the court
deemed proper. On July 1, 1965, the supreme court affirmed the First
District Court of Appeal in Crews 9 v. Dobson,7" and expressly and
unequivocally stated that "the purpose of omission from the rule was
to remove the use of nonsuits from our procedure.""
3. APPELLATE REVIEW OF NONSUIT ORDERS
During the biennium surveyed, a problem concerning the review-
ability of nonsuit orders emerged and although the supreme court in
Crews discredited the plaintiff's right to effectuate an abandonment of his
action by simply absenting himself from court after the adverse party
has answered or moved for summary judgment (viz., the nonsuit as
recognized at early common law), it is forseeable that appellate courts
will be confronted with the reviewability of such orders in the immediate
future. The problem is whether a plaintiff "coerced" into voluntarily
nonsuiting himself by a ruling of the court can successfully obtain review
of the ruling which induced the nonsuit when no final judgment has been
entered in the action.
At an early date,72 the Florida legislature by statute restricted
writs of error on appeals of law actions to final judgments. In 1885 the
legislature enacted the forerunner to section 59.05 which now provides:
When, because of any decision or ruling of the court on the
trial of a cause, it becomes necessary for the plaintiff to suffer
a nonsuit, he may appeal therefrom .... 71
Did this statute sanction appellate review of nonsuit orders entered at
law even though no final judgment appears in the action?
a. Conflict in the Courts
The Florida Supreme Court, for a period of approximately twenty-
eight years commencing in 1909 with its decision in Mizell Live Stock
Co. v. J. J. McCaskill Co.,74 and ending in 1937 with State ex rel. L. &
68. No Florida case has been found wherein a plaintiff was nonsuited at the insistence
of the defendant. Yet, such practice was recognized in early England. See 111 BLAcxsToNsE's
COMMENTAMES (l1th ed. 1791) at 376-377.
69. Dobson v. Crews, 164 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Massey and Weston, Civil
Procedure, 18 U. Mlass L. REV. 745, 774 (1964).
70. 177 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965). Noted in 20 U. MIAmi L. REv. 204 (1965).
71. Id. at 6.
72. REV. STAT. § 1263 (1892).
73. FLA. STAT. § 59.05 (1963).
74. 57 Fla. 118, 49 So. 501 (1909).
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L. Freight Lines, Inc. v. Barrs,7" without exception maintained that the
predecessor of section 59.05 did not create an exception to the rule that
writs of errors and appeals at law lie only from a final judgment and non-
suit orders were not excepted.76
Since 1961, the third district has adhered to a contrary view. Greene
v. American Trash Hauling Co.,77 best articulates that court's position.
In determining that a plaintiff may appeal an order of nonsuit though
not in final form, the court, citing to section 59.05, reasoned: "in 1941
the law was changed to except orders of involuntary nonsuit from the
statute restricting writs of error or appeals in law actions to final judg-
ments."7 In Bennett v. Fratus,78 when confronted with a defendant's
appeal from a plaintiff's procured order of nonsuit, which order lacked
the requisite language of finality, the third district noted, in dicta, that
59.05 "permits a plaintiff to appeal from an order, nonfinal in form, which
allows an involuntary nonsuit."8 0
The only indication of the first district position on the question is
in accord with the view adhered to by the third district. In Dobson v.
Crews,"' that court in obiter dicta observed:
Prior to the enactment of Sec. 59.05 . . no writ of error
could be taken to an order of nonsuit because it was not a final
judgment. However, this statute was adopted to provide the
plaintiff with a review by an appellate court on bill of excep-
tion of an adverse ruling which necessitated the taking of the
nonsuit8 2
At odds with the views expressed by the first and third districts is
the attitude of the second district, expressed in the opinions of Judge
Barns in Peaslee v. Michalski"' and Gregg v. Gray.4 Peaslee pointed
out that "an appropriate and regular way to conclude a case nonsuited
is to procure the entry of a final judgment."8 More significantly, the
opinion in Gregg developed the purpose underlying the promulgation of
section 59.05. In interpreting the crucial phrase "may appeal therefrom"
the court construed this language as meaning a "plaintiff, after having
75. 129 Fla. 668, 176 So. 756 (1937).
76. For cases in addition to those mentioned in the text accompanying notes 13 and 14
see Goldring v. Reid, 60 Fla. 78, 53 So. 503 (1910); Downing v. Weaver-Loughridge Lumber
Co., 94 Fla. 1096, 114 So. 666 (1927) ; Whitaker v. Wright, 100 Fla. 282, 129 So. 889 (1930).
The leading case decided under common law establishing that no appeal lies from a nonfinal
nonsuit order was Anderson v. Presbyterian Church, 13 Fla. 592 (1869).
77. 154 So.2d 726 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
78. Id. at 727.
79. 164 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
80. Id. at 828.
81. Supra note 69.
82. Id. at 256.
83. 167 So.2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
84. 176 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
85. Supra note 83 at 244.
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been coerced to take or suffer a nonsuit, has a right to have the rulings
coercing a voluntary nonsuit reviewed in the event of an appropriate
appeal or judicial review."8 In short, these words "are not to be taken
to mean that an appeal would lie from a ruling at trial ... ."87
Thus, the positions taken by the Florida appellate courts are in
conflict on the issue of whether a plaintiff may appeal directly from a
nonsuit order without awaiting the entry of a final judgment. Those
arguing in support of appellate review of a nonsuit order, non-final in
form, will rely upon the decision in Greene and the dicta and obiter
dicta appearing in Bennett and Dobson, respectively. Those seeking a
dismissal of an appeal taken by a plaintiff from a non-final order of non-
suit procured by the plaintiff will contend that the early supreme court
decisions and Gregg and Peaslee enunciate the correct view.
b. A Prognostication
The prohibition against review at law of non-final orders is now con-
stitutional in origin and jurisdictional in nature. Because the legislature
is without power to abrogate a constitutional provision, section 59.05 of
the Florida Statutes, it would seem, can no longer be interpreted as sanc-
tioning an exception to the rule that review at law lies only from an
order, final in nature, as was the case in Greene. Parenthetically it should
be noted that Greene is the only decision that squarely held that appellate
review can be had of a non-final order of nonsuit while all other decisions
on point held contra.
The purpose of the act was not to permit an appeal from a
ruling at trial permitting a nonsuit, but the object, purpose and
intent of the statute was to overcome the decisional law of
review that a voluntary nonsuit was a waiver of all previous
errors .... 88
Thus, it is submitted that appellate review of a non-final order of nonsuit
cannot be had.
c. Posture in the Trial Court of a Cause Nonsuited
Assume the trial court has sanctioned the taking of a nonsuit by a
plaintiff after the adverse party has answered or moved for summary
judgment. The question is then presented: What is the posture of the
cause in the trial court and how should an appellate court dispose of an
appeal taken from a final judgment entered on the nonsuit?
In regard to the posture of the cause in the trial court, only one
conclusion seems possible. Since the action could not be terminated by
86. Supra note 84 at 522. (Emphasis added.)
87. Id. at 522.
88. Gregg v. Gray, 176 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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nonsuit at the election of the plaintiff after answer or motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, the cause must still be pending in the
trial court. An appellate court, therefore, in disposing of an appeal taken
from a final judgment entered on a nonsuit should remand the case with
directions to set aside the order of nonsuit.
C. Orders Granting or Denying Motions for New Trial
In Florida, unless a final judgment has been rendered in the cause,
an order granting a new trial is reviewable only by virtue of section 59.04
of the Florida Statutes.89 According to the provisions of the statute "no
other grounds than those specified by the trial judge as a basis for the
order granting the new trial shall be considered as arguable upon said
appeal."' The above qualification on the statutory right to appeal an order
granting a new trial was construed to preclude an appellee from cross-
assigning as error the trial court's denial of his motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial on all
issues.9' The appeal was prosecuted by the plaintiff from an order grant-
ing the appellee a new trial on the issue of damages. In reaching its
decision, the court was required to determine whether the withdrawal
of the issue of liability from the jury on retrial was tantamount to a
final judgment. If such was the case, the appellee could have maintained
an independent and direct appeal from that judgment and on appeal he
could assign as error those matters attempted to be cross-assigned on
the appellant's present appeal. Such an order was held interlocutory in
nature. Accordingly, an independent appeal would not lie.
Since no provision is made by the Florida Statutes or Appellate Rules
for an appeal by a defendant from an order denying a motion for new
trial in a criminal case, these orders are not reviewable unless assigned
as error on an appeal from the final judgment. 2
D. Orders Entered During Arbitration Proceedings
Orders entered pursuant to arbitration proceedings are reviewable
only if they are of a type enumerated in the Arbitration Code.9 3 Thus,
89. See, however, page 27 wherein the question whether § 59.04 was superseded by Rule
4.2(a) is raised.
90. FLA. STAT. § 59.07(4) (1963).
91. Johnson v. City of Pensacola, 164 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
92. See Griffith v. State, 171 So.2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
93. FLA. STAT. § 57.29 (1963) lists the orders appealable. They are as follows:
(a) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under
§ 57.12;
(b) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under
§ 57.12(2)-(4) ;
(c) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this law.
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appellate jurisdiction was found to be lacking on an appeal from an
order of the trial court which vacated an award and directed a rehearing
de novo by the arbitrators. 4 However, an order affirming or denying
confirmation of an award previously entered is a reviewable order. Such
an order was present in State v. Pearson,"5 wherein the circuit court
entered a subsequent order amending a prior order which adopted the
findings of the arbitrators. The amending order merely deleted that part
of the prior order directing the payment of funds to the relators.
It should be noted that if an order entered pursuant to arbitration
proceedings is a reviewable order, "the appeal shall be taken in the
manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil
action."96
E. Orders Entered During Discovery Proceedings
As a general rule, orders entered in discovery proceedings in actions
at law do not qualify for review. "However, review has been granted in
exceptional cases where it appeared . . . that such orders were reason-
ably likely to result in substantial injury." '97 Only a case by case analysis
can illustrate what a court may consider exceptional for the purposes of
this rule. In Leithauser v. Harrison,98 for example, an order entered
during pretrial discovery proceedings in an action at law which required
the disclosure of privileged information was held to come within this
exception. Accordingly, review of the order by certiorari was held to be
appropriate.
F. Orders Dismissing Complaints Which Leave a Counterclaim Pending
The reviewability of one further type of order remains to be con-
sidered-an order granting summary judgment which dismisses the com-
plaint and leaves a counterclaim pending. Although such an order is a
final determination of the plaintiff's rights, it is treated as interlocutory
in nature and therefore is not appealable.99
94. Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). The rule announced in
Carner is in accord with the federal position. "An order setting aside an arbitration award
and directing a resubmission to arbitration lacks finality and is non-appealable." 7 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcTicE 81.05(7), at 4441 (1955). Stathates v. Arnold Bernstein S.S. Corp.,
202 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1953), is cited by Moore in support of the quoted rule. Note, however,
the well reasoned dissent by Judge Frank which is revealed in the following language:
My colleagues' decision will establish a precedent which . . . means that if a judge
enters an obviously erroneous order that an arbitration award be set aside, the person
who won the arbitration must endure the expense and delay entailed by a new
arbitration before he can appeal and obtain a reversal of that order.
95. 154 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
96. FLA. STAT. § 57.29(2) (1963).
97. Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So.2d 95, 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
98. 168 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
99. McLean v. Plant Fruit Co., 167 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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IV. PERSONS ENTITLED TO REVIEW
A. Who Are Parties?
Notwithstanding the common law rule that an appeal may only be
prosecuted by a party to an action who is aggrieved by the final decision,
order, judgment or decree,' 00 questions sometimes arise as to who are
parties for the purposes of appellate review.
In Miller v. Stavros,'0' the successful bidder at a foreclosure sale,
although not a named party in the initial proceeding, was nonetheless
held to have standing for the purpose of appealing an order denying his
motion for reimbursement of a resulting surplus. This decision is con-
sonant with the common law rule since the appellant was "aggrieved" by
the final decree.
A decision of the third district' denied a treating physician's peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to review an order of the trial court requiring
him to answer questions propounded in an interrogatory apparently
for the reason that a treating physician was not a party "aggrieved by a
final decision, order, judgment or decree." The court noted that the proce-
dure which should have been followed would have been for the petitioner
to refuse to comply with the court order. If the court then held him in
contempt, the physician would have been an "aggrieved" party.
Persons acting in a capacity as officers of the courts are not, as a
rule, proper parties to prosecute appeals.'08
As a general proposition, a party may only appeal from a judgment
that is adverse to him. However, Florida and most of the other jurisdic-
tions recognize an exception to the rule when the appellant receives a
favorable verdict and-assigns as error the denial of a motion for a new
trial which was made on the ground that the verdict was inadequate.0 4
A corollary to the requirement that a party may only appeal from a
judgment that is adverse to him is the rule that the appealing party
100. See 2 FLA. JuR., Appeals § 55 (1963).
101. 174 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
102. Strain v. Miami Transfer Co., 155 So.2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
103. In Buchanan v. Jimenez, 155 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), the Sheriff of Dade
County, upon the chancellor's suggestion, attempted to appeal an order dismissing his peti-
tion which sought instructions on what to do under the following circumstances: The Sheriff,
acting as custodian for the Federal Government of persons under Federal detention, had
custody of Jimenez. A writ of ne exeat instructing the Sheriff to take Jimenez into custody
was issued by a Florida chancellor. Upon demand made by the Federal Government to
deliver Jimenez to the Federal Marshall, the Sheriff filed a petition requesting instructions
from the chancellor. The petition, as above noted, was dismissed whereupon the Sheriff
appealed. The appellate court held the Sheriff of Dade County was not a proper party to
prosecute the appeal since he was merely acting in his capacity as Executive Officer of the
Circuit Court in and for Dade County.
104. Paul v. Kanter, 155 So.2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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must be aggrieved by the order or judgment appealed. It is because of
this requirement that appellate courts have held that a co-defendant may
not complain of a verdict rendered in favor of another co-defendant.
In Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Watson-David Ins., Co.,'015 the appellant
sought to prevent the adverse operation of the above rule by attempting
to distinguish his case on the ground that the cases in which the rule was
formulated involved joint tortfeasors. Although the court agreed "the
principle may have been first recognized in regard to such situations,"'0 °
it held that the principle is not limited to fact patterns where the co-
defendants are joint tortfeasors.
1. EFFECT OF AN APPEAL TAKEN BY A DEFENDANT UPON A
NON-APPEALING CO-DEFENDANT
Rule 3.11 provides in part that when an appeal is taken and all
parties to the cause are not named as parties-appellant, they shall auto-
matically become parties-appellee "regardless of the effect on such party
or parties of any order, judgment or decree appealed from." This proviso
was recently employed where a co-defendant in the trial court neither
filed a brief nor appeared in the appellate court, but was held, neverthe-
less, to be a party-appellee on an appeal taken by the other defendant.0 7
B. Waiver of Right
Parties otherwise entitled to review can by their conduct relinquish
that right. As a general rule, a party who consents to the rendition of
the order sought to be appealed is not entitled to review.0 8 This principle
was applied by the third district notwithstanding the trial court order,
which stated that compliance shall not be deemed to be a waiver or
estoppel of a right to review the consented-to-order. Thus, in Dargis v.
Maguire,' plaintiff-appellee was held precluded from cross-assigning as
error the order of the trial court requiring her to remit part of the jury
verdict. Although the remittitur was apparently agreed to by the plaintiff
as a condition to the denial of defendant's motion for new trial, the order
specified that such compliance "shall not be deemed to be a waiver or
estoppel on her part insofar as her right to cross assign as error (in any
subsequent appeal) that portion of the order * * * which directed the
105. 167 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
106. Id. at 36.
107. See Pan Am. Window Corp. v. Eason, 163 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). The
action was originally against the defendants in equity for an accounting. The complainant
and the non-appealing defendant had entered into an exclusive royalty agreement whereby
this defendant was given an exclusive right to manufacture complainant's designs. Apparently
the agreement was breached when the contractee subsequently leased the exclusive manu-
facturing right to another and accordingly, the lessee was ordered to account to the com-
plainant. The appeal was taken by the lessee. His co-defendant in the trial court, although
not represented in the appellate court, was considered a party appellee.
108. 2 Am. JUR. Appeal & Error § 211 (1936); 4 C.J.S., Appeal & Error § 213 (1957).
109. 156 So.2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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plaintiff to enter said remittitur. '' n0 Because "the trial judge could not
confer upon her the right to appeal from the remittitur order which she
voluntarily accepted,""' the appellee was precluded from cross-assigning
it as error.
A rather unusual application of the same principle occurred where the
lower court granted plaintiff's motion to transfer the cause from equity
to law after denying the same motions made by defendant-appellant on
two prior occasions. On appeal from the order transferring the cause, the
lower court was affirmed on the ground that the action of the trial court
was sought and induced by the defendants." 2
Although it is generally conceded that "one cannot ordinarily accept
or secure a benefit under a judgment or decree and then appeal from
it... when the effect of his appeal ... may be to annul the judgment,""13
the period of this survey has seen a conflict of opinion as to the application
of that rule to the acceptance of alimony payments. The principle itself
is one deeply rooted in Florida jurisprudence." 4
In a case of apparent first impression, the first district, in Fort v.
Fort,"5 held the principle applicable to a post decretal order reducing
the amount of alimony awarded in the final decree. In arriving at its
decision, the majority of the court was influenced by the provisions of
appellate Rule 3.8(b) which, upon proper notice and hearing, permits
the lower court, in its discretion, to order the payment of alimony pending
appeal. That Rule further provides:
The acceptance of the benefits thereof shall be without prejudice
to the rights of the beneficiary to raise as issues on the appeal
the correctness of any of the terms or provisions of the original
order or decree appealed." 6
Apparently the court viewed the Rule as limiting the rights of the parties
and not as remedial in nature. Contrary to the Fort holding, the second
district, in Blue v. Blue,"' adopted the view that an appeal by a wife
from an order reducing alimony previously awarded does not bring into
play the principle that one cannot accept the fruits of a decree and at
the same time appeal from it.
110. Id. at 898.
111. Id. at 898-899.
112. McSwiggin v. Edson, 172 So.2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
113. 2 R.C.L. § 44 (1929).
114. McMullen v. Fort Pierce Fin. & Const. Co., 108 Fla. 492, 146 So. 567 (1933).
115. 167 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Note, Appeal--Acceptance of the Benefits of
a Divorce Decree, 19 U. MLMmi L. REV. 659 (1965). See also Carter v. Carter, 141 So.2d 591
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) treated in Murray, Family Law, 18 U. MIA&I L. REV. 231, 239 (1963).
116. FLA. App. R. 3.8(6).
117. 172 So.2d 502 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). After the period of this survey, the Florida
Supreme Court in Brackin v. Brackin, 182 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966), adopted the view adhered to
in Blue.
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An offshoot of this general rule is that after receiving payment
of a judgment or decree, a party cannot appeal. In Fowler v. Alterman
Transp. Lines, Inc.,"' plaintiff-appellant sought to appeal from an order
granting the defendant a new trial and requiring the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff the costs of the former trial and the sum of 500 dollars
as a condition precedent to the granting of the new trial. The plaintiff's
acceptance of the payment was held to amount to a waiver of error and
hence precluded an appeal.
In Rubin v. Gordon,"9 the principle that prohibits an appellant
from appealing from an error which he invited, was applied to a plain-
tiff who submitted a letter in the trial court requesting that the court
grant defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action in libel per se. Notwithstanding the fact that the letter
was written "not in agreement with the contentions of the Defendant
nor in agreement with the indications of the Court to rule against Plain-
tiff, but [was] done with the thought in mind that further delays can be
avoided by presenting the Complaint in the Appellate Court,' 120 the
entry of the order dismissing the complaint without leave to amend was
held to have been invited by the appellant and accordingly he was
precluded from maintaining the appeal.
V. PRESENTING AND PRESERVING QUESTIONS IN THE TRIAL COURT
A. General Rules
The general rule that an appellate court will consider only those
questions that were properly raised in the lower court is adhered to by
the appellate courts of Florida.12 ' However, our appellate courts, as well
as the appellate courts of other jurisdictions, do recognize some limi-
tations on, and exceptions to, the general rule.
The purpose of the rule requiring a party to properly raise and
preserve, in the trial court, alleged errors for which review is ultimately
sought, is to increase the likelihood that litigation will seasonably end.
Indicative of this policy is Thal v. Roth,'2' wherein the third district
held that failure of the appellant to object in the trial court that the parol
evidence rule barred the defense proffered by appellees precluded the
appellant from raising this point on appeal.
A recent decision regarding the sufficiency of objections made
pursuant to Florida Civil Procedure Rule 2.6(b) also reflects the policy
precluding review of questions not properly raised and preserved in the
118. 159 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
119. 165 So.2d 824 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
120. Id. at 824.
121. For an exhaustive treatment of this principle, see 41 C.J.S. Appeal & Error, § 228
(1957).
122. 173 So.2d 174 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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lower court. Florida Civil Procedure Rule 2.6(b) provides "no party may
assign as error the giving of any charge unless he objects thereto" at the
time prescribed in that Rule. It has been held that an objection to the
court's instructions to the jury made on the ground that there was no
evidence in the record to support the charge is not sufficient compliance
with that Rule. 3 In short, an objection to the instruction given by the
trial court must, in order to properly preserve the question of the cor-
rectness of the charge, state distinctly the portion or omission of the
charge alleged to be erroneous and the specific grounds which render
the charge erroneous. The reason for requiring this practice is to inform
the trial court of his possible errors and give him an opportunity to
correct them and thereby obviate the necessity for resort to an appellate
court.
Where the point assigned as error was not properly preserved in the
lower court because of mistake, misunderstanding, or inadvertence on
the part of the lower court, relief may be obtained by proceeding under
Florida Civil Procedure Rule 1.38. Such relief was held to be available in
the rather involved factual situation presented in In re Ward's Estate,"'
where the co-executors appealed a final order which determined that no
compensation was due to them. The basis of this determination was that
the lower court believed, as reflected in the order appealed, that the co-
executors had stated to the court that no compensation would be claimed.
Affidavits filed in support of a rehearing on the contested final order
contained averments that at no time did the co-executors make such a
statement. After a hearing, the lower court entered an order which
reaffirmed that the co-executors had made an announcement waiving
compensation. In their briefs the appellants argued that the recitations
contained in both orders were a result of mistake, misunderstanding or
inadvertence on the part of the trial court. Since the record did not
affirmatively establish the alleged error, the appellate court hadno choice
but to affirm the order. However, to enable the appellants to proceed
under Rule 1.38, the appellate court stated that the order of affirmance
was without prejudice.
B. Fundamental Error Exception
An exception to the general rule that an appellate court will con-
sider only those questions properly raised in the lower court obtains
where the error complained of is of such a fundamental nature that a
fair trial could not have resulted. Failure to preserve the question in the
trial court under such circumstances will not preclude appellate review.
Thus, in one decision,'25 the appellate court permitted review of an
123. Henningsen v. Smith, 174 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
124. 172 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
125. Wofford Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Glass, 170 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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erroneous instruction which was based upon the introduction of an
inapplicable ordinance. Review was granted notwithstanding the failure
of the appellant to object at trial to the contested instruction. However,
the same result could have been reached on other grounds since the trial
judge indicated that the contested instruction would not be given and
Florida law is that no objection to a charge need be made where the
appellant is without notice prior to the time that the instruction is given
to the jury.126
Also coming within the fundamental error exception is that class of
cases wherein: (1) a party desires to assign error in the denial of a motion
for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, but
(2) fails to renew his motion at the close of all the evidence and (3)
the record reveals that the evidence is insufficient to support the ver-
dict.'27 As a general rule, the renewal of the directed verdict motion at
the close of all the evidence is deemed a prerequisite to appellate review
of the sufficiency of the evidence in the lower court to support the
verdict.'28 In Pickard v. Maritime Holdings Corp.,'29 the above noted
exception to the general rule was given application. The court, quoting
from Barron and Holtzoff, adopted the following passage as the test to
be employed in determining whether appellate review can be had not-
withstanding the failure of the appellant-defendant to renew his motion
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence:
[W] here the insufficiency of the evidence constitutes plain error
apparent on the face of the record which if not noticed would
result in a manifest miscarriage of justice.130
It should be noted that this test is broader in application than the facts
of the Pickard decision warranted since the court noted a total lack of
evidence to support the verdict of the lower court. Whether or not the
test will be given a liberal application and just what the courts will
consider "plain error" can only be determined by a case-by-case analysis
of future cases.
1. APPELLATE RULE 6.16
Florida Appellate Rule 6.16, pertaining to scope of review in criminal
appeals, embodies an exception to the general rule. The applicable
provision of that rule sanctions appellate review of "any other things
said or done in the cause which appear in the record" which the review-
126. The Wofford court cited Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Flournoy, 136 So.2d 32
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1961), for this principle.
127. Pickard v. Maritime Holdings Corp., 161 So.2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
128. See 6551 Collins Ave. Corp. v. Millen, 104 So.2d 337 (1958) discussed in Massey,
Civil Procedure, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 637 (1962).
129. Supra note 127.




ing court, in its discretion, "deems the interests of justice to require."
Burnette v. State,'3' vividly illustrates the application of that provision.
Although no objection was made when the trial court informed the jury
on the accused's eligibility for parole in response to the jury's inquiry,
the appellant was held to be able to assert this error on appeal.
There is no similar rule applicable to civil appeals. Where the error
committed below was not properly raised and preserved, unless the case
comes within the fundamental exception to the general rule which was
discussed previously, the appellant will be unable to seek appellate review
of the alleged error.
C. Motion for New Trial Not a Prerequisite for Review of Judgment
on Directed Verdict in Criminal Cases
On appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal action, the
appellant asserted error in the denial of his motion for a directed verdict
and in the denial of an untimely motion for new trial. Since the motion
for new trial was untimely, the question on appeal as stated by the
appellate court was whether the absence of a timely motion for new trial
precluded appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Although
the trial court was affirmed, the appellate court considered the merits of
the alleged error and answered the question presented by stating that
[I] f a defendant makes a timely motion for a directed verdict
it is unnecessary for him to then move for a new trial in order to
preserve for appellate review an assignment of error contest-
ing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. 18 2
The significance of this decision must be viewed in light of both
prior civil appeals cases and criminal appeals cases. In both classes of
appeals a distinction has been delineated between review of a verdict as
being contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and review of the
evidence adduced below in order to determine whether it was "legally
insufficient." Only in the latter situation can an appellant successfully
obtain review of the sufficiency of the evidence notwithstanding his
failure to move for a new trial.' The ability to obtain review of the
evidence on the ground that it is legally insufficient notwithstanding the
131. 157 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1963).
132. Hogwood v. State, 175 So.2d 817, 819 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
133. See Furr v. Gulf Exhibition Corp., 114 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959) treated in
Massey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. MiAsi L. REv. 591 at 639-640 (1962) and Sheehan v. Allred,
146 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) treated in Massey and Weston, Civil Procedure, 18 U.
MIA L. REV. 745, 793 (1964). The majority of the court did note that "many previously
decided criminal cases hold that the absence of a timely motion for new trial precludes
appellate review of sufficiency of evidence." Supra note 130, at 818. However, those cases
espousing this principle were distinguished from the facts in the Hogwood case on the
ground that in none of the prior cases was it indicated that the defendant moved for a
directed verdict.
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appellant's failure to move for a new trial is, however, conditioned upon
the making of a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of all the
evidence.
VI. PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING REVrEW
A. Limitation as to Time
1. APPLICABILITY OF RULE APPEAL TIMES
Essential to the jurisdiction of appellate courts is the timely taking
of an appeal. An appeal is timely if the notice of appeal together with
filing fees, where required, are filed with the clerk of the lower court
within sixty days from the rendition of the final decision, order, judg-
ment, or decree appealed.134 The sixty-day period is applicable to all
appeals "unless some other period of time for taking an appeal is
specifically provided by statute" or appellate rules. 13 5 In Saffan v. Dade
County,' the question before both the Third District Court of Appeal
and the supreme court' was which of three possible appeal time periods
was applicable to appeals from judgments of conviction entered in the
Metropolitan Courts. The circuit court, exercising its appellate jurisdic-
tion, dismissed an appeal from a judgment of conviction of a traffic
violation entered in the Dade County Metropolitan Court which had been
filed more than twenty days, but less than ninety days, after the entry of
the judgment. That court held that the Metropolitan Home Rule Charter
which provides a twenty-day appeals period was applicable. On certiorari
to the Third District Court of Appeal, the circuit court was affirmed but
on the ground that section 932.5218' of the Florida Statutes, which
governs appeals from municipal courts, was controlling. However, the
supreme court specifically held that metro courts are not municipal courts,
and therefore reversed the district court of appeal with directions to
affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Although neither of the courts
specifically determined the applicability of Florida Appellate Rules 6.1
and 6.2,11' the supreme court's determination that metro courts are not
municipal courts precludes the application of these Rules.
Where the Superintendent of the Division of Roid Prisons pros-
ecuted an appeal from a final judgment entered in a habeas corpus
proceeding, the sixty-day period applicable to civil appeals which is
134. See FLA. App. R. 3.2(a).
135. FLA. App. R. 3.2(b).
136. 159 So.2d 102 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
137. County of Dade v. Saffan, 173 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1965).
138. FLA. STAT. § 932.52(2) (1963) stipulates a thirty-day period within which an
appeal may be taken from municipal courts.
139. FLA. App. R. 6.1 sets forth that part VI of the Rules shall govern appeals in
criminal cases taken to the supreme court, the district courts of appeal and the circuit courts
including appeals from municipal courts. Rule 6.2 prescribes a ninety-day period within
which a defendant may prosecute an appeal.
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prescribed in the rules was held controlling and not the thirty-day period
found in section 924.10 which governs appeals taken by the state in
criminal cases. 4 ° This result, obtained in Crownover v. Shannon,' was
said to follow since section 924.10 "is only a limitation on the time
within which the 'State of Florida' may appeal from a decision in a
criminal case, which is prosecuted in its name as a party."'42 Evidently,
an appeal by the Superintendent of the Division of Road Prisons is not
an appeal by the state. Furthermore, habeas corpus proceedings are civil
in nature and not criminal and therefore section 924.10 cannot be
controlling since that statute is applicable only to appeals in criminal
cases. The latter factor is significant because it establishes that appeals
from habeas corpus proceedings, whether by the defendant or the state,
are governed by the sixty-day period prescribed in the rules for non-
criminal appeals.
By virtue of a rewording of section 73.14 of the Florida Statutes,
appeals of final judgments rendered in eminent domain proceedings are
now evidently controlled by the sixty-day period under the Rule. The
prior 1961 statutes prescribed a thirty-day limitation within which an
aggrieved party could prosecute an appeal.' However, the current
statute reads:
Any person aggrieved by the final judgment may appeal to the
appropriate district court of appeal, unless review by the su-
preme court is authorized by Article V of the state constitution,
in the manner and within the time prescribed by the Florida
Appellate Rules .... '"
2. COMPUTING TIMES UNDER THE RULES
The rules provide that when an act is required to be performed within
a specific time after service of a notice or paper and service is made by
mail, three days are to be added to the otherwise controlling time
period.'45 During the period surveyed this proviso was expressly em-
ployed in one decision and was apparently the underlying basis for the
result reached in another decision.
In New York Ins. Co. v. Kurz,"' the application of the above Rule
resulted in a respondent's cross-petition for certiorari filed on the twenty-
second day after petitioner mailed his brief and the transcript of the
140. Crownover v. Shannon, 170 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1964).
141. Ibid.
142. Supra note 138 at 300.
143. "Any person aggrieved by the final judgment may appeal to the supreme court,
but no appeal shall be entered after thirty days from the rendition of the judgment ... .
FiA. STAT. § 73.14 (1961).
144. FiA. STAT. § 73.14 (1963) (Emphasis added.).
145. See FLA. App. R. 3.4(b)(3).
146. 174 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1965).
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record. Although Rule 4.5 (c) (3) prescribes a twenty-day period after
service of the designated papers within which a respondent may cross-
petition for certiorari, three days were added to the twenty-day period
since service of the designated papers was made by mail.
Martorano v. Florida Industrial Comm'n,147 involved the timeliness
of a petition for certiorari filed sixty-one days after the mailing of the
order which denied the petitioner's application for an appeal. The Third
District Court of Appeal noted that the applicable statute sanctioning
review by certiorari of such orders does not prescribe how or when they
become "rendered" and accordingly was confronted with the issue
whether the sixty-day period prescribed for the filing of a petition for
certiorari commenced to run from the date of mailing or from some time
thereafter. The court held that the petition was timely and reasoned that
the "date of notice" was the critical event.
[W]hen notice of such an order is given by mailing, the date
or time of notice should be held to be some time after the
mailing .... three days should be allowed, making the date of
notice, and therefore the beginning of the 60 day period for
certiorari, three days after the date of mailing. 48
a. Sundays
Two schools of thought exist on the subject of the proper construc-
tion to be afforded statutory provisions prescribing that certain acts
must be accomplished within a certain number of days. 4 ' The difference
between the two views becomes apparent when the last day for per-
formance of the required act falls on a Sunday. Those who adhere to the
strict construction school of thought maintain that Sunday is not to be
excluded and that the required act must be performed by the prior
Saturday. The liberal view, however, permits an extension of time so
that the required act may be performed on the following Monday. From
an early date, 50 both views were recognized in Florida-the strict con-
struction view was applied to statutory provisions; the liberal view was
incorporated in the Rules.' 5' This distinction was recently obviated by the
supreme court in Dade County Planning Dep't v. Ransing.152 There the
147. 160 So.2d 744 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
148. Id. at 745-746.
149. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 482 (1958) for a thorough treatment of the question
whether terminal Sundays are to be included or excluded in the computation of appeal
periods.
150. See Simmons v. Hanne, 50 Fla. 267, 39 So. 277 (1905) cited in Ransing, infra
note 152.
151. The Federal Rules also reflect the liberal view. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
152. 158 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1963). Dade County Planning Dep't v. Ransing was followed
in State Road Dep't v. White, 161 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1964) wherein the respondent questioned
whether a terminal Sunday can be excluded in computing the time for filing the notice of
appeal under section 73.14 of the Florida Statutes.
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court held that an application for review before the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commission was timely even though it had been filed with the deputy
commissioner on the twenty-first day which was a Monday. Judge Terrell
dissented on the ground that the above noted distinction should have been
retained. One further aspect of the Ransing case should be considered.
Rule 3.18, governing the computation of times, by its terms, encompasses
"any applicable statute." But the question of whether or not the adopters
of Rule 3.18 intended the liberal view to be applicable in all instances
was not considered by the Ransing court. The decision did, however,
achieve that result.
3. TIMELINESS OF APPEAL NOTICES IN CRIMINAL APPEALS
Although the timely filing of the notice of appeal with the clerk of
the lower court is a requisite to appellate jurisdiction, recent district
court of appeals' decisions have revealed a liberal judicial attitude in
regard to the filing of appeal notices in criminal actions. In one deci-
sion,"'s rendered prior to this survey, the appellant, an inmate of a state
prison, had presented a notice of appeal in proper form for mailing to
prison authorities seven days before the last day for filing. The court held
that the notice was timely even though it was mailed after the time for
filing had expired. In a more recent decision,' a notice of appeal actually
filed more than ninety days after the judgment and sentence were entered
was held timely where the incarcerated appellant delivered the appeal
notice to prison officials who mailed it on a date which in the normal
course of the mail would have been timely delivered to the clerk of the
lower court.'55
This liberal attitude was rejected by the supreme court in State v.
Smith15 6 in favor of the principle that the "timely filing of a notice of appeal
is jurisdictional and neither [the supreme court] nor the District Courts
have any power to waive the requirement." In Smith, prohibition proceed-
ings were instituted by the attorney general to prevent the district court
from exercising jurisdiction over an appeal previously dismissed. The
notice of appeal was dated May 14, 1962, but was filed on May 22, 1962-
ninety-one days after conviction and sentence were entered. Rule absolute
was issued and the court noted that the other decisions of the
district courts of appeal, which recognized an exception to the rule that
the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, were never pre-
sented to the supreme court for review.
153. Perez v. State, 143 So.2d 663 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
154. Henry v. State, 158 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). This decision, however, was
recalled and quashed at 163 So.2d 24 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1964).
155. However, where the notice of appeal was actually filed 108 days after the order
appealed was entered but was in the front office of the prison 19 days before the incarcerated
appellant was called to notarize it, the appeal was dismissed as being untimely. See Burke
v. State, 160 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
156. 160 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1964).
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In the Perez, Henry and Smith cases, the failure of the appellant
to timely file his notice of appeal was caused by the conduct of a state
functionary. In considering what possible relief is available under these
circumstances, the court analogized to a practice sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court and suggested that relief may be sought by pro-
ceeding in habeas corpus.
4. TIMELINESS OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Provision is made in the Rules for the tolling of the period within
which an appeal may be taken when a timely and proper motion for new
trial or petition for rehearing or reconsideration has been made in the
lower court. 1 7 The question of when a motion for new trial is timely for
the purposes of tolling the running of the appeal period was at issue in
Miami Transit Co. v. Ford,58 where the appellant served the motion upon
appellee within ten days after the verdict was rendered but did not
file the motion in the trial court within that period. The third district
construed Florida Civil Procedure Rule 1.4(d) in pari materia with Rule
2.8(b)' 59 and held that a motion for new trial must be filed within the
ten-day period prescribed for service of the motion on the opposing
party in order to be timely under Appellate Rule 1.3. On certiorari to
the supreme court, the motion was held timely, despite the "hip-pocket"
filing, since it was timely "served."
As illustrated above, it is the service of the motion for a new trial
upon the opposing party, not the filing of the motion in the lower court,
that is the critical act for purposes of tolling the running of the appeal
period. This construction by the Florida Supreme Court is in accord
with a recent federal interpretation of the analogous Federal Rule-73
(a). Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part
that "the running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely mo-
tion ... under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact
.... ,O Rule 52(b) provides that such a motion shall be "made not later
157. See FLA. App. R. 1.3 on the definition of "rendition."
158. 155 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1963).
159. FLA. R. CIv. P. 2.8(b) provides that "a motion for a new trial . . . , shall be
served not later than 10 days after the rendition of verdict or the entry of a summary
judgment." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.4(d) requires that "all original papers, copies of which are
required to be served upon parties, shall be filed with the court either before service or
immediately thereafter."
160. The complete text of the pertinent provisions of that rule reads:
The running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pur-
suant to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal
fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the entry
of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules: grant-
ing or denying a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) ; or granting or denying
a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether
or not an alteration of the judgment would be required of the motion is granted;
or granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment;
or denying a motion for a new trial under Rule 59.
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than 10 days after entry of judgment.. . ." In Koehane v. Swarco, Inc., 6'
the appellant served a motion to amend upon defendants' counsel within
the ten-day period required by Rule 52(b). However, it was filed with
the clerk eleven days after the entry of judgment. The federal court held
the motion timely, reasoning that a motion is "made" under Rule 52(b)
when it is served upon opposing counsel.
5. EXTENDING TIME FOR FILING ASSIGNMENTS
Assignments of error must be filed within ten days after the notice
of appeal has been filed.' 62 Where, however, a motion for extension of
time for filing assignments of error is made in either the appellate court
or lower court, the ten-day period is suspended until the entry of the
order denying the motion. These principles were applied where the ap-
pellant filed a motion for extension of time in the lower court which was
denied. A similar motion made in the appellate court was also denied." 4
The concurrent orders of denial were held to have tolled the ten-day
period. The time sequence of the case may be illustrated as follows:
Notice of appeal filed-September 25.
Motion for extension of time in lower court-September 25.
Motion for extension of time in appellate court-October 25.
Entry of lower court's order of denial-October 28.
Entry of appellate court's order of denial-November 27.
Filing of assignments of error-December 2.
The assignments of error were held timely since the required ten-day
period was suspended from September 25 (the date the motion was made
in the lower court) to October 28 (the date the lower court's order
denying the motion was entered) and was further suspended until the
appellate court entered on November 27 (the date of its order denying
the motion for extension of time made on October 28).
6. TIME GOVERNING THE SUPERSEDING OF ORDERS TAXING COSTS
Florida Appellate Rule 3.2(f) provides that appeals may not be
taken by the original plaintiff until all accrued costs specifically taxed
161. 320 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1963).
162. See FLA. App. R. 3.5(a).
163. Under Rule 3.5 subd. (a), Florida Appellate Rules, appellant had ten days
after filing notice of appeal to file his assignments of error. Under Rule 3.5, subd.
(d), the time for filing assignments of error may be extended by the appellate
court or by the lower court. Rule 3.9, subd. (f) contemplates suspension of time
in the proceedings, pending disposition of the motion. See Connell v. Mittendorf,
Fla. App. 1962, 147 So.2d 169, where this Court recognized that Rule 3.9, subd. (f)
could be utilized to extend the time for filing briefs upon the filing of timely
motions. Compare: Quality Furniture House v. General Bond & Discount Co., Fla.
App. 1957, 97 So.2d 203, where the appellant's motion for an extension of time
was not timely made and no good cause was shown for the default. Coggan v. Cog-
gan, 161 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
164. Coggan v. Coggan, 161 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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against him in the lower court have been paid. However, accrued costs
need not be prepaid by the original plaintiff when: (1) the taxation of
costs has been assigned as error, and (2) the order, judgment or decree
taxing costs has been superseded. 165
Within what time must the original plaintiff supersede the order
taxing costs in order to prosecute an appeal without paying accrued costs?
This question was resolved in Abrahams v. Mimosa.'66 The appellate
rules, as the majority and dissenting opinions testified, were susceptible of
two entirely different interpretations. Rule 3.2(f) provides an original
plaintiff need not, as a condition precedent to taking an appeal, pay
accrued costs "when he has assigned as error the taxation costs and
has superseded the order . . . ." The superseding of the order could be
read in pari materia with the requirement that the order taxing costs be
assigned as error and accordingly the conclusion could be reached that the
superseding bond must be perfected at or before the original plaintiff
files his assignments of error. On the other hand, Rule 5.5 recognizes
that a party desiring to supersede a final decision can do so "at any time
prior to filing the record-on-appeal" in the appellate court. The majority
of the court concluded that the former interpretation of the rules was the
better interpretation. The court based its conclusion on the fact that
Prior appellate decisions have held that the appellee may waive
his right to move to dismiss an appeal for failure to pay costs,
by filing cross-assignments, cross-directions, entering into stipu-
lations on filing his brief. Therefore, if the appellee can be
considered as having waived his right to move to dismiss at this
early stage of appellate proceedings then certainly the appellant
must be in default by failing to post the supersedeas.' 67
Judge Carroll strongly dissented on the ground that appellate Rule 5.5,
not the majority's interpretation, ought to govern the time within which
an order taxing costs must be superseded.'
It is worth mentioning the disparity in their calculations of time
between the effect of the majority decision and that of the dissenting
opinion. In practical effect, the time difference is significant. Under Rule
3.5, the assignments of error must be filed within ten days after the
notice of appeal has been filed. However, under Rule 5.5 a supersedeas
165. See FLA. App. R. 3.2(f).
166. 174 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
167. Supra note 166 at 83. The majority of the court's position was followed in Nolan
v. Eshleman, 176 So.2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
168. [It does not appear to be consistent to hold that "has assigned," as contained
in the proviso in the cost rule, is complied with by assigning error any time within
the 10 day period allowed in the appellate rules for filing assignments of error,
and at the same time to hold that the requirement of "has superseded" must be
complied with by perfecting supersedeas in less time than is allowed by the appel-




bond can be applied for at any time before the record-on-appeal is re-
quired to be filed in the appellate court and under Rule 3.6(j)(1) the
record-on-appeal is required to be filed within one hundred and ten days
after the notice of appeal has been filed. There is accordingly a one
hundred-day difference between the two views.
7. TIME GOVERNING APPEALS OF ORDERS GRANTING NEW TRIALS
IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
In Dean v. State Road Dep't,1' 9 the supreme court was confronted
with the question whether appeals of orders granting motions for new
trial when entered in eminent domain proceedings are governed by sec-
tion 73.14 or whether section 59.08 is controlling. The order appealed
which granted a new trial was entered forty-six days prior to the filing
of the notice of appeal. On appeal, the third district"10 dismissed the
appeal as being untimely-that court expressly ruling statute 73.14 as
controlling. The supreme court, however, held that "appeals from
orders granting motions for new trial in eminent domain proceedings are
governed by sections 59.04 and 59.08. .... ,"I' Accordingly, where an
appeal is taken from an order granting a motion for new trial entered in
eminent domain proceedings, the aggrieved party has sixty days from
the entry of the order within which to file his notice of appeal.
Dean it should be noted was decided on the basis of the 1961 statutes
which prescribed a thirty-day period within which a final judgment in
eminent domain proceedings could be appealed. Furthermore, the decision
turned upon whether the order appealed was final or interlocutory in
nature which determined whether the then statutory prescribed thirty-
day appeals period was controlling or whether the sixty-day period
prescribed in section 59.08 was applicable. Because of the recent reword-
ing of statute 73.14, which stipulates that the time prescribed by the
Florida appellate rules is to govern the time within which a final judg-
ment rendered in eminent domain proceedings may be appealed, the
question in Dean is now moot. In either eventuality, i.e., whether the
judgment appealed is a final or an interlocutory order granting a new
trial, the sixty-day period under the appellate rules is controlling.
8. PETITIONS FOR REHEARING: THEIR EFFECT UPON THE TIMELINESS OF
RULE 3.16 PETITIONS AND APPEALS FROM MOTIONS DENYING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE-RULE ONE HEARINGS
The use of petitions for rehearing in the trial court has been con-
sidered in light of particular situations--cost judgments and proceedings
under Criminal Procedure Rule Number One. From an appellate pro-
169. 156 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1963).
170. 144 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
171. Supra note 169 at 650-651.
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cedure view point, the problem is whether or not such petitions are
sanctioned by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure since a timely and
proper petition for rehearing will toll the running of the review period
until an order denying the petition is entered.
In general, petitions for certiorari to review cost judgments taxed
in the lower court after the filing of the mandate must be filed within
twenty days after the entry of the cost judgment.'72 It has been held
that such petitions are not timely filed when filed more than twenty days
after the entry of the cost judgment, but less than twenty days after a
"petition for rehearing" has been denied.'78 In short, Appellate Rule 1.3
providing for the tolling of the rendition of a decision, judgment, order
or decree, when a timely and proper motion for rehearing has been made,
is not applicable to petitions for review of cost judgments since according
to Rule 3.16(c) the time of the entry of such judgments is the effective
time and not "rendition."'17
4
In Taylor v. State,'75 the use of petitions for rehearing in proceedings
under Criminal Procedure Rule Number One was considered. On August
7, 1963, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment under Rule One.
That motion was denied on October 2, 1963, but a petition for rehearing
was filed on September 20, 1963, which was not denied until December
23, 1963. In dicta, the court stated:
There is no provision in Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 nor in
the Statutes pertaining to criminal procedure for the filing of a
petition for rehearing. In the absence of such statute or pro-
cedural rule there cannot be 'a timely and proper motion or peti-
tion for a new trial, rehearing or reconsideration' which will
suspend the rendition of the order as provided by Florida Ap-
pellate Rule 1.3, 31 F.S.A. 76
This statement, made by the Taylor court, raises some problems. Al-
though that court correctly stated that neither Rule One nor the statutes
governing criminal procedure expressly sanction petitions for rehearing,
petitions for rehearing are sanctioned by the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. If proceedings under Rule One are civil in nature, petitions for
rehearing including motions for new trial and reconsideration would
seem proper thereunder. Whether or not proceedings under Criminal
Procedure Rule No. 1 are civil in nature or criminal is not easily answered.
The rule itself is entitled "Criminal" and is found in a new section
headed Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and not in the civil procedure
172. FLA. App. R. 3.16(c).
173. Dames v. Dames, 156 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
174. Judge Hendry, concurring specially, agreed with the result reached by the majority
but did not agree that the use of the word "entry" instead of "rendition" had any significance.
He concurred with the majority on the ground that the Rules do not provide for the filing
of a petition for rehearing of a cost judgment.
175. 167 So.2d 93 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
176. Id. at 94.
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rules which supports the conclusion that proceedings under Rule One are
criminal. Accordingly, petitions for rehearing motions for new trial and
reconsideration would appear not to be allowable thereunder. Rule One
proceedings are, however, essentially independent actions displacing the
common law writ of coram nobis which was civil in nature. Furthermore,
the sixth paragraph of Rule One specifically states that appeals from
final judgments under Rule One are as "on application for a writ of
habeas corpus." In Crownover v. Shannon, habeas corpus proceedings were
characterized as civil in nature which is suggestive of the belief that
petitions for rehearing are appropriate under Rule One proceedings.
B. Power of the Lower Court to Affect Appellate Proceedings
After the notice of appeal is filed or a motion to dismiss is lodged in
the appellate court, the lower court is divested of jurisdiction and ac-
cordingly cannot rightfully affect the appellate proceedings.' A notable
exception to that rule exists where a notice of appeal is filed after the
rendition of an appealable order but within the time allowed for filing a
petition for rehearing. In theory, when such a petition is filed in the lower
court, its effect is to negative appellate jurisdiction depriving the appel-
late court of any power other than that of dismissing the appeal. The
operation of both the above rule and its exception were exemplified in
Citizens Cas. Co. v. Oaks,'78 and State v. Pearson.17 9 In the former case,
appellant, after a motion to dismiss was lodged in the appellate court for
failure of appellant to timely file his brief and the record on appeal, pro-
cured an order of the trial court extending the time for filing those papers.
Since the motion to dismiss preceded the order of the lower court, that
order was held a nullity. Relief from failure to prosecute under those
same circumstances, however, could have been sought under Rule
3.8(a). 8 0 In Pearson, the final decree appealed was rendered on Septem-
ber 25th; notice of appeal was filed on September 29th; and petition for
rehearing was filed in the lower court on October 3rd, which was followed
by the order granting rehearing on October 20th. The timely filing of the
petition for rehearing was held to destroy the finality of the order
appealed and accordingly divested the appellate court of jurisdiction.
C. Notice of Appeal
1. CONTENTS
According to the terms of Rule 3.2(c), notices of appeal must con-
tain five items: (1) the titles of the courts from which the appeal is taken
177. In Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Oaks, infra note 178, the filing of a motion to
dismiss the appeal was held to divest the trial court of power to grant the appellant an
extension of time for filing his brief and the record on appeal in the appellate court.
178. 167 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
179. 156 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1963).
180. Since the record on appeal had not been filed, the appellant should have moved
the appellate court for leave to file a motion in the lower court requesting an extention of
time.
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and to which the appeal is taken and the title of the cause appealed;
(2) the name of the appealing party, indicating whether he was the plain-
tiff or defendant in the trial court; (3) the name of the opposing party,
indicating his status in the trial court; (4) the nature and date of rendi-
tion of the order, judgment or decree appealed from; and (5) the date,
book and page of the public record in which it is recorded.
Compliance with the requirement of the name and designation of the
appealing and opposing parties is necessary in order that the appellate
court can determine over whom and to whom the court will look for com-
pliance with its judgments and orders. Two cases have considered the
sufficiency of notices of appeal in view of this requirement. Failure of
appellants in one case' 8' to state the name and designation of all the ap-
pealing parties resulted in a dismissal of the appeal, even though the con-
tempt proceedings out of which the judgment appealed arose involved
one hundred and fifty individuals, approximately thirty-seven of whom
were ordered to pay a fine or be imprisoned. No one was named as an
appellant; the notice of appeal read "The defendants affected by the
below described order .... "
Moreover, the notice of appeal must be directed to an order, judg-
ment or decree appealable in nature. If the orders to which the notice of
appeal is directed are not appealable, jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
is lacking and the appeal will be dismissed. Thus, where the notice of
appeal was directed to an order denying "Appellant's Motions for Judg-
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial" rather than to
the final judgment, the First District Court of Appeal,'82 under those
circumstances, dismissed the appeal.
If the notice of appeal is directed to two final judgments, and the
second judgment is the only effective final judgment, mention of the first
judgment will be treated as surplusage, and accordingly the notice will be
held effective. This reason was assigned by the appellate court in Preston
v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 88 wherein the orders referred to in the notice
of appeal were an order granting appellee's motion to dismiss with preju-
dice and a subsequent order entered on appellant's petition for rehearing
which set aside the first order of dismissal but again dismissed the com-
plaint, this time for lack of jurisdiction. Although the subsequent order
was "without prejudice," the appellate court apparently treated it as a
final order. In the course of its discussion, the court indicated that had
the second order not been final, the notice of appeal would be defective.
The requirement that the notice of appeal recite the date, book and
page of the public record in which it is recorded was liberally construed in
181. Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 160 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
182. Greyhound Corp. v. Carswell, 171 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
183. 166 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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a recent case184 wherein the appellant in its notice of appeal recited that
the appeal was taken from a decree recorded on page one hundred and
twenty-one of the official record book. In point of fact this page merely
contained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the court-the
final decree appearing three pages later on in the official record book.
Because of "this obvious scrivener's error" the appellee asserted that the
apparent deficiency of the notice of appeal defeated the appellate court's
jurisdiction. The court stated:
The form and content of the notice of appeal should be liberally
construed in the interest of manifest justice and if it gives the
adverse party and the court information by which the appealed
decree can be discovered in the record with a reasonable degree
of certainty it should be held sufficient. 8 '
2. SINGLE NOTICES OF APPEAL
In the protracted litigation of Dye v. Reichard,'86 a husband and
wife in a personal injury action filed a single complaint in which they
averred each was bringing suit on separate causes of action. There was
one trial, two verdicts and two judgments. A new trial, however, was
granted as to one of the judgments. The defendant filed a single notice
of appeal in which he named each judgment and designated where each
was recorded. On appeal the Second District Court of Appeal held that
the notice of appeal was insufficient and did so on the assumption that
both judgments were appealable. Plaintiffs procured a rule to show
cause why the judges of the district court should not exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The supreme court ruled that the specification of the non-
appealable order in the notice of appeal was surplusage and therefore the
notice of appeal was in fact directed to a single judgment. However, the
court did state:
Even if the two judgments specified in the notice of appeal were
both appealable orders . . . , the court would have jurisdiction
under the notice filed.1
87
The above quoted dicta should be contrasted with Vander Car v.
Pitts,'88 where separate suits were brought against the defendant which
were consolidated for trial and, following the delivery of a single verdict,
the court entered two final judgments. The single notice of appeal was dis-
missed. The court reasoned that separate notices of appeal were necessary
in order to appeal judgments rendered in separate cases even though such
cases were consolidated for trial. 89
184. City of Pinellas Park v. Cross-State Util. Co., 176 So.2d 384 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
185. Id. at 386.
186. 169 So.2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), reversed 177 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1965).
187. Reichard v. Smith, 177 So.2d 340, 341 (Fla. 1965).
188. 166 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
189. Id. at 839. Borland v. South Patrick Util. Corp., 122 So.2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960),
was cited to in support of this proposition.
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D. Prepayment of Costs Not Essential Where Appeal Is by the State
It is now settled that prepayment of costs taxed in the lower court
is not a condition precedent to the right to maintain an appeal where
the original plaintiff prosecuting the appeal is the state.' 90 The appellate
court, as authority for this holding, cited State v. Rushing'9' and Appel-
late Rule 5.121 2-the statutory codification of that decision. It should
be noted that this exception to the general rule requiring costs to be pre-
payed by the original plaintiff before he can appeal has, to date, only
been extended in favor of the state. A municipal corporation must comply
with Appellate Rule 3.2 (f).193
VII. EFFECT OF APPEAL ON PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. Supersedeas Stay
The rule at common law was that a writ of error operated per se as
a supersedeas, thereby staying the issuance of execution on the judg-
ment.' In Florida, as in most jurisdictions, the common law rule has
given way to express statutory provisions.
Except when the appeal is prosecuted by the state in a purely official
capacity,'96 a supersedeas bond must be posted if the appeal is to prevent
the issuance of execution to enforce the judgment. 97 Whether or not a
supersedeas bond can be posted as a matter of right depends upon the
nature of the proceedings appealed. Only where an appeal is taken from
a final money decision, a decision in probate, guardianship or one in-
volving estates of infants is supersedeas bond available as a matter of
right. 9" In appeals to review interlocutory orders, decrees in equity or
reviews of compensation orders of the Florida Industrial Commission,
the granting of the supersedeas bond is within the discretion of the lower
court.' 99 In the instance of workmen's compensation orders, provision is
made in the rules for review of an order denying supersedeas. 200 Where
the granting of supersedeas pending appeal would have been tantamount
to issuing a provisional license to appellant to operate as a milk distributor
190. State Road Dep't v. Bramlett, 171 So.2d 34 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1965).
191. 17 Fla. 223 (1879).
192. The material provisions of Rule 5.12(1) in substance recognizes that the filing of
the notice of appeal when the appeal is taken by the state in a purely official capacity per-
fects the appeal and, unless supersedeas is expressly required by the court, automatically
stays the execution or performance of the judgment.
193. See Miami v. Murphy, 132 So.2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
194. R.C.L. § 97, Effect As Supersedeas in General, p. 122.
195. FLA. STAT. § 59.13 (1963) governs supersedeas in civil cases.
196. See FLA. APP. R. 5.12(1).
197. See FLA. APP. R. 5.2.
198. FLA. App. R. 5.3(a) and (b).
199. FLA. App. R. 5.1 and 5.4.
200. FLA. App. R. 5.10.
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when his license had been lawfully revoked, no abuse of discretion was
established.2"'
Florida appellate courts have again reaffirmed that the typical "no
action" clause as found in the standard form of automobile liability in-
surance policies issued in Florida, do not stay garnishment proceedings
during the insured's appeal from the final judgment." 2
B. Motions for New Trial and Petitions for Rehearing Made in the
Lower Court-Their Effect upon Obtaining Review
Where either a petition for rehearing or a motion for new trial are
made in the trial court important questions arise as to the affect of these
actions upon appellate jurisdiction. Different principles are applicable
depending upon when and by whom the petition or motion is made.
Where one party timely serves a petition for rehearing and the ad-
verse party, during the pendency of the petition, attempts to appeal, it
was held in Seiferth v. Seijerth.°. that such an appeal is improper since
the timely petition for hearing destroys the finality of the judgment ap-
pealed.
A different result, however, is reached where the petition for re-
hearing and the appeal are served and filed by the same party. In this
class of cases, the rule applied is that "the filing of a notice of appeal by
a party constitutes an abandonment of his previously filed undisposed
of petition for rehearing."20 4 Thus, in Scott-Whitaker Co. v. Joyce Prop-
erties, Inc.,2" 5 the appellee's motion to dismiss an appeal, taken three days
after appellant petitioned for a rehearing in the lower court, was denied.
The rule announced in Scott-Whitaker, however, is not applicable
in the converse situations, viz., the appeal is taken first and then either
party petitions for a rehearing. In State ex rel. Owens v. Pearson,20° the
timely filing of a petition for rehearing by the appellee was held to have
201. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 159 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
202. Conley v. Singleton, 171 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
It is well settled in Florida that a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against
a defendant may proceed in garnishment against the defendant's insurer immedi-
ately upon the entry of a final judgment by the trial court, regardless of whether
an appeal is taken, where the judgment is not superseded.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Stroud, 173 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
203. 121 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960) discussed in Nash, Appellate Procedure, 15 U.
MIA L. Rav. 645, at 649 (1962).
204. Scott-Whitaker Co. v. Joyce Properties, Inc., 155 So.2d 661, 662 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
205. Ibid.
206. 156 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1963). This problem, Moore observes, will rarely arise in prac-
tice since the time for moving for a new trial or serving a petition for rehearing is rela-
tively short in comparison with the time allowed for taking an appeal. 6 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTICE, § 59.09(5), at 3856. State v. Pearson was previously discussed in Part VI, Sub-
topic B-Power of the Lower Court to Affect Appellate Proceedings.
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the effect of nullifying the appellant's previously filed appeal. Pearson
also established that the question whether the petition was timely and
properly presented in the trial court is to be determined by the trial court
and not the appellate court.
Florida's position on the effect upon appellate jurisdiction of a peti-
tion for rehearing or a motion for new trial made in the lower court should
be contrasted with the federal view.2"7 Federal courts adhere to the
position that "while a timely motion for new trial is pending before the
lower court, an appeal by either the movant or the opposing party can-
not be perfected . *... ,o8 Apparently, then, the rule announced in Scott-
Whitaker Co. is not in accord with federal practice. There is no una-
nimity of opinion in the federal dourts concerning the procedure to be
followed when a timely and proper petition for rehearing is made in the
lower court after an appeal has been taken.2°9 It is clear, however, that
the filing of a notice of appeal negatives the jurisdiction of the trial court
so that it may not thereafter consider a motion for new trial or a peti-
tion for rehearing where either are made subsequent to the taking of the
appeal.
C. Relief from Judgment under Florida Civil Procedure Rule
1.38(b)-Its Effect upon Appellate Proceedings
Both the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure l0 and the Federal
Rules2 ' provide that a party may apply to the trial court for relief from
a judgment, decree, or order on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, ex-
cusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud. It is clear that leave
of the appellate court must be sought if the motion is to be presented in
the trial court after a notice of appeal has been filed and while the appeal
is still pending.212 Of course, leave of the appellate court is unnecessary,
207. See Note, Procedure-Rendition of Judgment, 19 U. MiAMI L. REv. 314 (1964).
208. MooP., FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 59.09(4), at 3856.
209. Moore recommends the following procedure:
FRsT, serve the motion in the district court within the time stated in Rule 59(b)
or, if the motion is to alter or amend the judgment, then within the similar time
stated in Rule 59(e).
SECoND, move the court of appeals (or the Supreme Court if a direct appeal has
been taken to it) to remand the case to the district court so that the latter court
may pass on the motion for new trial that was timely made there.
THIRD, a showing of substantial merit underlying the motion for new trial should
be made to the appellate court in order to satisfy the latter that the trial court
would be justified in granting a new trial.
FOURTH, the party desiring to move for new trial, if not the party that has taken
the appeal, should consider whether in addition to moving for new trial he also
desires to take an appeal. If so, he should perfect a cross-appeal within the time
for appeal as computed from the entry of the judgment.
6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 59.09(5), pp. 3860-3864.
210. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b).
211. The Federal counterpart of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b) is FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b).
212. "The general rule is that when an appeal is taken from the district court the
latter court is divested of jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal, until the




if not impossible, where the notice of appeal still remains to be filed in
the reviewing court.2 1 Whether or not leave of the appellate court must
be obtained after the decison on appeal is a question upon which there is
a conflict.
In 1954, and again in 1955, the advisory committee on the rules for
civil procedure in the federal courts proposed amendments which provided
that a motion made pursuant to Rule 60-the counterpart of Florida
Civil Procedure Rule 1.38(b)-"does not require leave from an appellate
court, though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon appeal to
that court." '214 Although the proposed amendments were not adopted by
the Supreme Court, there are federal cases2" expressly negating "any such
barren requirement.
'216
A recent Florida case, State v. Anderson,217 indicates that leave of
the appellate court is necessary. In Anderson, a complaint entitled "Orig-
inal Proceedings by Petition in the Nature of a Bill of Review" was filed
in a circuit court whereby the complaintant sought to obtain review of
a judgment of the district court which had reversed the circuit court's
decree. The complaint alleged that "the original oversight or error of the
District Court of Appeal, in reversing the Circuit Court Chancellor, re-
sulted in a legal or technical fraud of [the complaintant] . . . ." In an-
swer to the writ of prohibition directed to the judge of the circuit court,
the state urged that the complaint was brought under authority of Rule
1.38(b), and therefore it was not necessary to seek and obtain leave
from the appellate court as a prerequisite to bringing the complaint.
Though the Rule "does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or
213. In Odum v. Morningstar, 158 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), relief under FLA. R.
Crv. P. 1.38(b) was obtainable where a motion thereunder was made nine months after the
"mistaken decree" was entered and no appeal was taken from the final decree.
The decisions rendered by the appellate courts of this state recognize that any judg-
ment, order or decree rendered by a trial court may be amended by that court to
speak the truth or to supply inadvertently omitted facts or recitals any time before
appeal of the order is taken.
Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) (Emphasis added.).
214. Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft (May 1954).
215. Moore cites the following Federal cases in support of the statement that in the
event the
motion for relief will not raise matters that are within the compass of the man-
date ...the district court clearly has the power to proceed with the 60(b) motion
without leave of the appellate court:
Carpenter v. Rohn & Haas Co., 9 F.R.D. (D. Del. 1949), aff'd 18 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1950);
Maddrix v. Dize, 61 F. Supp. 946 (D. Md. 1945). 7 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 60.30(2),
at 339.
216. The 1955 advisory committee expressed the view that
such a requirement of leave from the appellate court is a useless and delaying for-
malism. An appellate court cannot know whether the requirements for reopening
a case under the rule are actually met without a full record which must obviously
be made in the district court.
1955 Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, note, p. 62.
217. 157 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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proceeding,1218 the appellate court held that it was necessary to first ob-
tain leave from the appellate court. Without that leave the circuit court
could not obtain jurisdiction to grant relief to a party from a judgment,
decree; order, or proceeding which has become the judgment of the ap-
pellate court.
An appellate court can, apparently sua sponte, temporarily relinquish
jurisdiction to the trial court for the purpose of receiving and disposing
of a motion for relief made under Rule 1.38(b).219
VIII. RECORD-ON-APPEAL
It is an incontrovertible rule of appellate procedure that the record-
on-appeal must clearly establish the error, vel non, complained of by the
appealing party.220 Where the alleged error involves the weight and suffi-
ciency of the evidence, all the evidence which the trial judge or jury had
the benefit of examining must be made a part of the record-the appel-
lant cannot be selective when he prepares the record-on-appeal. Both of
these principles were involved in Reynolds v. Reynolds.22" ' The husband
appealed from that portion of the decree granting separate maintenance
to his wife based on her counterclaim interposed in the divorce action.
On appeal, the appellant urged that there was a failure of proof upon
which the decree awarding separate maintenance could be sustained. Al-
though witnesses other than the parties had given testimony, the record-
on-appeal was limited to a transcript of the testimony given by the par-
ties. "Since a complete record was not presented to the appellate court,
there was no basis upon which error could be found," '222 and accordingly
the judgment was affirmed.
When the pleading and proving of certain types of evidence is con-
218. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.38(b).
219. This conclusion is implicit in the procedural aspects of Southern Ry. v. Wood, 171
So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). On November 14, 1962, plaintiff served a series of requests
for admissions on the defendant, one of which requested that defendant admit that plain-
tiff's decedent was employed by defendant at the time of his death. Within ten days the
defendant filed a response denying the request but failed to verify the response as required
by Civil Procedure Rule 1.30. However, on December 11, 1962, defendant filed and served,
this time under oath, responses to the requests for admissions. These apparently were held
timely, for a pre trial order was entered stipulating that the case would be tried on the
issue of "whether or not deceased ...was an employee of the defendant corporation."
Id. at 616. At trial, plaintiff's counsel invoked Civil Procedure Rule 1.30 in order to obtain
a ruling by the court that plaintiff established the issue of employment since defendant
failed to answer, under oath, the first request for admissions within ten days. The motion
was evidently left without disposition. After a verdict for the defendant, judgment was
entered and an appeal followed. On its own initiative the appellate court temporarily relin-
quished jurisdiction to the trial court for the purpose of receiving and disposing of a Rule
138(b) motion.
220. 3 Am. JUa., Appeal and Error, § 572, p. 213 (1960). "The record must clearly
show and point out the error complained of, as all questions must be determined by the
record as certified to the appellate court."
221. 155 So.2d 188 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
222. Id. at 189.
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trolled by express statutory provisions, the record must clearly establish
that the statutory provisions were complied with in the trial court. This
principle was evidently the reason why the Second District Court of Ap-
peals in a recent decision22 refused to consider foreign law which was
raised for the first time in the appellate court. The court stated in support
of its conclusion that the record must establish that foreign law was
pleaded and proved in the trial court. Where the record does not so indi-
cate, the appellate court will indulge in one of two presumptions: either
that the foreign law was not introduced at trial, or that it was intro-
duced, but not in compliance with the statute.
Where an appellee in her brief referred to testimony disclosed in
a deposition which was not introduced into evidence at the trial, the ap-
pellate court held that the failure to introduce the evidence precluded it
from being considered a part of the record-on-appeal. 24
IX. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
It is through the assignments of error that the appellate court
and the adverse party are informed of the questions of which the appel-
lant or the appellee desire review. 2 5 For this reason, it is most infre-
quent that an appellate court will consider errors which have not been
properly assigned or cross-assigned, even when the errors were properly
preserved below. In Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co.,22 the de-
fendant, on appeal to the district court, by appropriate assignment of
error challenged the trial court's order granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment as to the issue of liability. Although a motion for
new trial was made and denied after the jury returned its verdict fixing
damages, the denial of that motion was not assigned as error. The
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial upon
the issues of liability and damages. In ruling upon petitioner's writ of
certiorari which, if granted, would have permitted the district court to
review its decision, the supreme court quashed that part of the district
court's judgment which remanded the cause for a new trial on the issue
of damages. In so doing, the supreme court stated: " [W] e believe the rule
in Larabee v. Capeletti, supra, should be followed here, since the assign-
ment of error by appellant (respondent here) in the District Court of
Appeal only referred to the issue of liability and not that of damages. 2 7
A proper assignment should designate the specific act which is al-
223. Brotherhood's Relief & Compensation Fund v. Cagnina, 155 So.2d 820 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1963).
224. Gross v. Hatmaker, 173 So.2d 158 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
225. 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, § 695, at 287 (1960). See textual discussion on page
125 of Bailey v. Keene & Applefield v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., infra, notes 241 and
242, respectively.
226. 173 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1965).
227. Id. at 681.
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leged to be erroneous. 22 An appellate court is not charged with the duty
to search the record for errors. 229 However, since "grounds for error need
not be stated in the assignment, ' 230 it is not essential to there state why
the designated judicial act was erroneous. Illustrative of the operation of
these principles is Porter v. Childers,23' wherein the appellant's assign-
ment of error "that the court erred in making and entering that 'Final
Decree' dated May 1, 1963, and filed in the above styled cause on May 3,
1963, and Recorded on May 6, 1963, in Chancery Order Book 1678 on
Page 291 of said Circuit" was held effective. The proper place to inform
the court why the error assigned is considered erroneous is in the argu-
ment section of the brief and not in the assignment of error.232
If any part of an assignment which is based on multiple grounds is
bad, the entire assignment fails.233
X. BRIEFS
The Rules require that the appellant's main brief contain a state-
ment of the case in a clear and concise manner.2 34 A more liberal attitude235
appears to prevail when infractions of the Rules occur in criminal appeals.
It was, nonetheless recently held in a criminal appeal that a statement of
a single question consisting of ninety-eight lines and covering more than
two pages does not meet the requirements of this rule.23 6 The court, how-
ever, granted the appellant an additional fifteen days within which to
amend the brief so as to contain an appropriate statement of the point
involved.
The appellant's main brief must contain an appendix unless the
record-on-appeal consists of a certified transcript or stipulated statement
of seventy-five pages or less.237 Furthermore, where the appeal is inter-
locutory in nature, "no record on appeal shall be required or permitted
other than certified copies of the appeal papers and the judgment or order
228. ". . . [Ilt is well settled that the assignment must be specific; a general assign-
ment without specification of the particular point relied on . . . will not as a general rule
be considered." 2 R.C.L. § 135, p. 161. The above Rule was apparently the reason why
the appellate court in Flex v. Blair, 173 So.2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) declined to consider
on rehearing failure of the appellate court to initially rule upon the granting of a new trial
in the alternative by the lower court. The court stated: "Although the general assignment
of error may have preserved the point, it was not specifically assigned as error and it was
neither raised in appellants' point on appeal nor pointedly argued by brief." Id. at 520.
229. 3 Am. JuR., Appeal and Error, § 695, pp. 287-288 (1960).
230. Indeed, in Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. City Gas Co., 167 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964) it was observed that assignments and cross-assignments lie to judicial acts and not
to the grounds given by the court for its judicial acts.
231. 155 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
232. Bailey v. Keene, 171 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; see Rule 3.7(f) (4).
233. Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. v. Sellers, 161 So.2d 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
234. FLA. App. R. 3.7(f)(3).
235. See Nash, Appellate Procedure, op. cit. supra note 176.
236. State v. Hodges, 169 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
237. FLA. App. R. 3.7(j).
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appealed from. ' 238 These provisions have been liberally construed. In
Grace v. Grace,239 the appellant filed a record-on-appeal, a portion of
which was designated as "testimony and proceedings." Although it con-
sisted of seventy-eight pages, it was filed as a portion of the record-on-
appeal in lieu of being incorporated in an appendix. Being of the opinion
that there had not been such a violent departure from the requirements
of the rules as would justify striking the offensive portion of the record,
the appellate court considered the record as it. had been prepared by the
appellant.
Rule 3.7(f) (4) stipulates which matters should be contained in the
argument section of the appellant's brief and how those matters should
be presented.
Argument in support of the position of the appellant. This sec-
tion of the brief shall contain a division for each of the points
involved. Specific assignments of error from which the points
argued arise should be stated, and if any reference to the origi-
nal record or appendix is made, the page should be given. 4'
This Rule is rarely complied with in practice and is infrequently inter-
preted by the courts. For these reasons, two decisions are worthy of note.
Bailey v. Keene24' and Applefield v. Commercial Standard Ins.
Co.,242 reasoned that the Rule was promulgated for the benefit of the ap-
pellate court. It also "serves the important purpose of alerting adverse
counsel ...to the particular phase of the proceedings assailed by the
appeal. ,243
The reason for the rule is that the basis of an appeal is the
assignment of errors and on review the appellate court's first
mental inquiry is what 'error' does the appellant claim as a
ground for reversal-what was it the lower court did that was
erroneous? What did the judge do-what act?244
Merely stating that the point argued arises out of certain numbered as-
signments of error does not satisfy the provision of the Rule that specific
assignments of error be stated.
XI. REviEw
A. Orders Granting New Trials
By statute,245 Florida appellate courts, when reviewing orders grant-
ing motions for new trial, are confined to the grounds specified by the
238. FLA. App. R. 4.2 (d).
239. 162 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
240. FLA. App. R. 3.7(f) (4).
241. 171 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
242. 176 So.2d 366 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
243. Id. at 375-376.
244. Supra note 242, at 445.
245. FLA. STAT. § 59.07(4) (1963).
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trial judge in granting such motions. Thus, where a new trial was granted
pursuant to a motion grounded upon the improper admission of evidence,
the appellate court held that it could not consider, on appeal, a finding
which was not made by the trial judge,246 i.e., that the verdict was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
Although it is true that review of an order granting a new trial is
confined to the grounds specified by the trial judge, where several grounds
are listed by the trial judge, any one of which is sufficient to warrant a
new trial, the order granting the new trial will be affirmed. In Austria v.
Donovan,2 7 six grounds were listed by the trial judge in granting the
plaintiff's motion for new trial. Before the appellate court considered
the merits of appellant's contentions, it announced: "If the lower court
was correct on any one of the six grounds given, we would be required
to affirm. 248
B. Orders Granting Reinstatement of a Cause after Dismissal
Previous to this survey period,249 the first district had indicated
that a lower court's discretion, exercised to reinstate an action at law
after it had been properly dismissed for failure to prosecute, could not
be reviewed by common law certiorari or interlocutory appeal.250 The
question left open-Whether such orders may be reviewed by plenary ap-
peal-was answered in the negative during the period surveyed. Although
the second district in Cams v. Quarles,251 assigned as a reason for dis-
missing the appeal the lack of finality of the order appealed, it would
appear to be axiomatic that such orders by their very nature cannot be
final in form. Both decisions warrant the conclusion that there is no ap-
propriate means for reviewing an order reinstating a cause prior to a
complete determination of the cause.
C. Orders Transferring a Cause from Equity to Law
Appeals taken from orders transferring the cause from equity to
law with leave to file an amended complaint are premature where the
New Trials, Review of Order Granting-In every case in which the trial court
shall enter an order granting a motion for a new trial, the trial judge shall indicate
in the order granting said motion the particular ground or grounds upon which said
motion was granted, and upon appeal from any such order, if taken under the
statutes providing for appeal from orders granting new trials, no other grounds
than those specified by the trial judge, as a basis for the order granting the new
trial, shall be considered as arguable upon said appeal.
See Gates v. Fisher Hardware Co., 167 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
246. Ewing v. Miller, 172 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
247. 169 So.2d 377 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
248. Id. at 377.
249. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Jowers, 118 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
250. Nash, in the 1961 survey of Appellate Procedure cites Jowers, supra note 225 to
illustrate this proposition.
251. 157 So.2d 536 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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trial court's action is alleged erroneous "because the plaintiff cannot
have an action at law." ' 2 In short, until the amended complaint is filed,
the appellate court cannot anticipate what cause of action, if any, the
plaintiff will allege at law.
D. Orders Taxing Costs
Cost judgments, by themselves, are not appealable orders.253 How-
ever, at least three distinct means of securing review of orders taxing
costs are available in Florida when the orders are entered either in a
final judgment or subsequently. The three available means were
thoroughly considered in Craft v. Clarembeaux.5 4 Plenary appeal from
the final judgment and a proper assignment of error will bring the cost
order to the appellate court for review when the cost determination is
entered in the final judgment. Plenary appeal can also be utilized where
the order taxing costs has been entered subsequent to rendition of the final
judgment, but prior to a timely appeal from the final judgment. Where
the cost determination is made after entry of a final judgment and an
appeal has been taken from the final judgment, interlocutory appeal can
be used either when the time for appealing the final judgment has expired
or when the aggrieved party does not desire to appeal from the final
judgment. Where the order taxing costs recurs below on mandate of the
appellate court, after the cause has been appealed, an appropriate means
for securing review is prescribed in Rule 3.16. Finally, as was the case in
Craft, writ of certiorari may be an appropriate means of securing review
of cost determinations. In Craft, the order was entered subsequent to a
non-final, unappealable, voluntary nonsuit. The court in Craft expressly
limited the applicability of Rule 3.16(c) exclusively to those cases
where "the cost judgment is entered after the mandate of the appellate
court has been lodged in the cause. ' 255 Evidently the writ of certiorari
sanctioned in Craft is brought under, and governed by, Rule 4.5.
E. Municipal Legislative Action
Section 176.16256 of the Florida Statutes recognizes that statutory
certiorari is the appropriate way to seek review of municipal legislative
action. The petition for the writ, as provided in that statute, must be
presented within thirty days after the filing of the decision. In Thompson
v. City of Miami,257 the question presented was whether relief, in addi-
tion to section 176.16, can be sought in an equity injunction suit notwith-
252. See MacMermell v. McKinley, 158 So.2d 142 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
253. See generally 2 Am. JUR., Appeal and Error, § 98, p. 906 (1961).
254. 162 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
255. Id. at 327.
256. FLA. STAT. § 176.16 (1961). The 1963 legislature substantially amended section
176.16 so that review is now governed by the Florida Appellate Rules.
257. 167 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1964).
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standing the fact that the time for bringing certiorari has passed. The
court construed the statute as directory and not mandatory. Thus, it
does not impair the basic equity jurisdiction conferred by the constitution.
XII. DECISIONS ON APPEAL AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
A. Doctrine-Law of the Case
The doctrine of the law of the case, in general, operates to preclude
a reviewing court on a successive appeal or a trial court upon remand
from considering questions25 which were decided on a previous appeal.
Therefore, "when an appellate court passes upon a question and remands
the cause for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the
'law of the case. .. .' ""' It has been stated that the purpose underlying
the doctrine is the same that controls the application of the doctrines of
res judicata and stare decisis.
[They] are adhered to by [the Florida supreme court] and
courts of other jurisdictions in order to lend stability to judicial
decisions and the jurisprudence of the state, as well as to avoid
"piecemeal" appeals and to bring litigation to an end as expedi-
tiously as possible.26°
According to prior Florida cases, the doctrine (1) applies only to
subsequent stages of procedure in the same case, (2) is not decisive of
points presented in a second writ of error that were not presented in a
former writ of error, and (3) is not applicable when the facts are
different at the two trials.26' Two recent decisions demonstrate that the
doctrine continues to operate only within this restricted area.
The question posed in Strazzulla v. Hendrick,262 was whether the
doctrine must be adhered to in all instances or whether an appellate
court has the power to disregard the doctrine in exceptional cases. Al-
258. When a case has been once decided . . .on appeal, and remanded to the circuit
court, whatever was before this court, and disposed of by its decree, is considered
as finally settled. The circuit court is bound by the decree as the law of the case,
and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. That court cannot vary
it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further
relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon any matter decided on appeal;
or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.
Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 175 So.2d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
Florida's position, as evidenced in the above quote, is in accord with the position
obtaining in the federal courts.
The authorities seem uniform that a mandate from a reviewing court is controlling
as to all matters within the compass of such mandate and as to such matters the
district court, after remand, can take no further action.
7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 60.30, p. 339 quoting from Carpenter v. Rohn & Hass Co.,
9 F.R.D. 535, 537 (D. Del. 1949).
259. 3 AM. Jua., Appeal and Error, § 985, p. 541 (1960).
260. Strazzulle v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965).
261. These conclusions were stated by the supreme court in Furlong v. Leyborne, 171
So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1963).
262. Supra note 261.
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though the question was not one of first impression it is significant. Two
conflicting lines of case authority had emerged in Florida law, each
supporting a contrary answer. 63 In Strazzulla, a tort action was com-
menced against the petitioners but which terminated in their favor. The
cause was affirmed by the district court of appeals, and then was brought
before the supreme court by conflict certiorari. The court there quashed
the judgment of affirmance and remanded the cause to the trial court.
After the second trial, the plaintiff again appealed, assigning as error the
giving of an instruction, an error which was previously considered on
the first appeal. In the first appeal the court had found no error; in the
second appeal the court reconsidered the propriety of the instruction and
held it improper under the facts and circumstances of the case. In answer
to the appellees' contention that a reconsideration and reversal on this
point was precluded by the application of the doctrine "law of the case,"
the second district stated:
With this contention we cannot agree. The facts and circum-
stances on this appeal are materially different from those on the
former appeal; but even if we now should find that we were in
error on that point of the case, we have the power to correct it.
264
On certiorari the supreme court discharged the writ and held the decision
of the second district to be correct. However, the supreme court expressly
limited the operative scope of the exception recognized in the instant case
to "unusual circumstances and .. .only where 'manifest injustice' will
result from a strict and rigid adherence to the rule.' 265 For example, the
exception is proper in order to give effect to the law of a sister state under
the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.
It is also proper where non-adherence to the doctrine will permit
correction of an error created by an intervening decision of binding
affect which would call for the application of different law in the subse-
quent appeal.266 In the second appellate appearance of Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Hallatt,"7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, compelled by the
Erie doctrine to apply Florida law, was confronted with the problem of
whether it should grant a petition for rehearing and reconsider its prior
determination of what the Florida law was. After the second trial of the
263. Supra note 261. Wherein the court exhaustively cited to and classified prior Florida
cases along these two conflicting lines.
264. Hendrick v. Strazzulle, 168 So.2d 156, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
265. Supra note 263.
266. Both of these examples were cited in the instant case as exemplifying exceptional
circumstances under which the doctrine "law of the case" need not be adhered to. Beverly
Beach Properties v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1963), was cited in support of the first
exception while reference was made to In re Reamer's Estate, 331 Pa. 117, 200 At!. 35 (1938)
in support of the second exception. See 87 A.L.R.2d at p. 299 for other exceptions to the
general rule.
267. 326 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1964), which was predicated upon the leading case, Messen-
ger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912).
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cause a Florida appellate court had rejected the federal court's view of
the applicable Florida law. Determining that the facts created an ex-
ceptional situation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the second
appeal granted the petition for rehearing and vacated its initial decision
decided on the first appeal.
In a second case, the Florida supreme court in Furlong v. Ley-
bourne"8 held the doctrine inapplicable. Three sisters brought an ac-
tion in the circuit court seeking a determination of their right to be
subrogated to the rights of mortgagees. The circuit court held, in sub-
stance, that should the sisters satisfy the indebtedness of the estate they
would have a right to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagees.
The district court of appeal reversed the circuit court on the ground that
it had ignored the doctrine "law of the case," which, if applied, would
have denied the right of subrogation. This conclusion was reached from
an examination of two prior appellate decisions "involving the same
parties and factual situation." The supreme court ruled that the doctrine
"law of the case" was inapplicable. In so ruling they drew a fine distinc-
tion between the issues involved in the two earlier cases and the issue
involved in the Furlong case. Since the court found that issues involved
in both cases were not precisely identical, the doctrine "law of the case"
was inapplicable.
A final, related problem which arises concerns the procedure which
should be followed in order to effect a reconsideration of the point
previously decided either in the appellate court or the lower court. This
problem, in turn, involves a consideration of the duration of an appellate
court's jurisdiction over a cause and the ability of a lower court to
modify the appellate mandate upon remand. Both topics are treated in
the succeeding sections.
B. Termination of Appellate Jurisdiction
A rather astonishing principle was announced by the Second District
Court of Appeal in Jerry v. State,269 concerning the power of an appellate
court to reconsider its decision after it has entered its mandate. The
significance of this decision can be better visualized once the reader's
attention is directed to general principles, well-nigh universally accepted,
which pertain to the termination of jurisdiction on appeal.
In the absence of fraud, accident, inadvertence, or mistake, it is
well settled that an appellate court "is without jurisdiction to recall the
mandate and entertain a petition for a rehearing."27 The policy underly-
ing this rule is based upon the notion that somewhere in the prosecution
268. 171 So.2d I (Fla. 1963).
269. 174 So.2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
270. 2 R.C.L., Appeal and Error, § 150, p. 175.
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of a cause there must be a point when finality is achieved "and the logical
point for appellate jurisdiction over an action to terminate is that time
when there is again vested in the trial court jurisdiction to proceed,
carry out and enforce any judgment delivered."27' Though there is
authority for the proposition that jurisdiction of an appellate court ex-
tends to the end of the term during which the decision in question was
rendered, "it seems to be the well-nigh universally recognized rule that
... the jurisdiction of an appellate court over a given cause terminates
whenever, regularly, without inadvertence or fraud, it returns the record
to the court of general jurisdiction." '72
In Jerry v. State, an appeal was taken from an order denying relief
under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. Relief was denied by the trial
court on the authority of numerous cases, including White v. State.s73
Those decisions were followed on appeal and a per curiam affirmance
was filed on March 12, 1965. The mandate of affirmance was issued on
April 2, 1965; prior to that time the Second District Court of Appeal
receded from its holding in White v. State. A motion for rehearing, not
timely under Rule 3.14,274 was stricken. Subsequently, the appellate
court, sua sponte, recalled and set aside their mandate and granted a
rehearing. In so doing, the court stated:
[T]his court retains the right to recall and vacate a mandate
for good cause until the end of the term in which said mandate
was issued.2
Since no mention was made of fraud, accident, inadvertence, or mistake,
the action of the Second District Court of Appeal must be viewed as
having been taken, not in accord with the above discussed general rules,
but rather as an exception thereto. It is submitted that the Jerry decision
must be limited to its precise facts.
C. Power of a Lower Court to Modify the Mandate
of an Appellate Court
In the second appellate appearance of Rinker Materials Corp. v.
Holloway Materials Corp.,278 the question was whether a lower court,
after an appellate mandate has been issued and the cause transferred to
the lower court, can, sua sponte and without leave of the appellate court,
depart from the terms of the appellate mandate. The second district
271. Ibid.
272. 2 R.C.L., Appeal and Error, § 217, p. 265.
273. 165 So.2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) receded from in Jones v. State, 174 So.2d 452
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
274. The time within which a petition for rehearing can be filed is "15 days after the
filing of the decision or order of the Court." FLA. App. R. 3.14.
275. Supra note 271, at 773.
276. 175 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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answered in the negative. 7 The court did suggest that the proper pro-
cedure to be followed in presenting new matter in the lower court after
remand would be to seek and obtain permission of the appellate court.
The question decided in Rinker is not new to Florida courts. In
State v. Knott,278 the supreme court was confronted with a trial court's
order granting a motion to file a bill of review. The motion was granted
after the cause had been in an appellate court and remanded with
directions that a decree compelling specific performance be entered.
The supreme court decided that, "[t] he trial court had no jurisdiction to
enter the questioned order. 12 79
D. Impossibility of Furnishing a Record
In a case of apparent first impression, the question was: What
relief, if any, is available to an appellant who is unable to perfect an
appeal because essential stenographic notes were destroyed by the court
reporter. A provision is made in the rules whereby the parties may sign
a statement showing how the points to be presented arose and how they
were decided in the lower court. That statement constitutes a part of
the record-on-appeal. 8 0 That rule, however, presupposes the parties can
agree on what occurred in the lower court.
According to the weight of authority, 28 ' where a material portion of
a record, through no fault of appellant's counsel, has been lost or
destroyed, without possibility of substitution, the reviewing court will
order a new trial. In Van Scoyoc v. York,282 this position was adopted by
the second district which reasoned that an appellate court, incident to
its power to require that it be furnished a complete and accurate record-
on-appeal, necessarily has the power to award a new trial where essential
records have been destroyed by an official of the lower court through no
fault of the appellant. A possible limitation upon such relief was
intimated. It was suggested that appellate jurisdiction must have at-
tached prior to the discovery of the misfortune and the portion of the
record that was lodged in the appellate court must unequivocally establish
the appellant's right to relief. Under these circumstances, the York court
awarded a new trial on all issues.
However, in Thomas v. State,28' appellant's motion to remand the
277. See Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 167 So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1965).
278. 97 So.2d 265, 268 (Fla. 1957). "Accord, Berger v. Leposky, Fla. 1958, 103 So.2d
628; King v. L & L Investors, Inc., Fla. App. 1962, 136 So.2d 671; Petition of Dermeulen,
Fla. App. 1960, 122 So.2d 318." Supra note 280, at 566.
279. Supra note 280, at 566.
280. FLA. App. R. 3.6(h).
281. 3 A.m. JuR., Appeal and Error, § 1225, p. 723 (1960).
282. 173 So.2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
283. 160 So.2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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cause to the trial court with instructions to grant a new trial was denied
where the basis for the motion was that the notes taken by the reporter
assigned to report the trial proceedings were illegible and therefore
could not be transcribed. In denying the motion, the court merely cited
Rule 6.7(f), which permits parties to file with the clerk of the lower court
an agreed upon condensed statement of all or part of the testimony.
Evidently, the Thomas court was of the opinion that both parties could
reach an agreement as to what transpired in the trial court. Accordingly,
the facts of Thomas were not the same as York.
E. Recoupment of Attorney's Fees by Appellee
The appellate rules recognize that some attorney's fees incurred
by the appellee may be taxed against the appellant in the appellate
court.284 Whether or not they will be taxed against the appellant depends
upon the limiting clause of Rule 3.16(e), "where ... allowable by law."
A special statutory provision grants appellees in appeals from
condemnation proceedings the right to recoup attorney fees as against
the appellants where the appellee is successful in the appeal.285 In State
Road Dep't v. Mutillo,28 6 an appeal was prosecuted by the condemning
authority from an order granting the appellees a new trial. Because the
order failed to specify the particular ground for granting the new trial,
the order was reversed. Since the appellees were not successful in the
appeal, they were not entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred on
appeal as against the appellant.
XIII. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
The rules expressly recognize the power of an appellate court to
subject persons committing violations of the rules to penalties. 87 Rarely,
however, have penalties been imposed where the violation occurred in
connection with new or unusual questions. The recency of the warning
and the magnitude of the violation are apparent factors considered by
the courts in determining whether a penalty should be imposed as well as
the form the penalty should take.2 8
284. FLA. App. R. 3.16(e).
285. Supra note 287.
286. 155 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
287. FLA. App. R. 3.17.
288. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 171 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) the
recency of the warning was assigned as the reason for not imposing a penalty against the
appellant-insurer after the court concluded the appeal was taken merely as a dilatory tactic.
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Quarrier, 175 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) is indicative
of the severity of a penalty that may be assessed. 500 dollars plus 6 percent interest from
the date of order were assessed against the appellant and awarded to the appellee under
Rule 3.17 after the court concluded that the appeal by the appellant-garnishee was frivolous
and not taken in good faith.
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XIV. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS
Questions of great public concern will generally be accepted by the
supreme court, especially where the question involves statutory validity.
Although there is no mechanical test which readily indicates which ques-
tions are of a great public concern, the supreme court has recently set
forth two criteria that can be utilized in determining whether a par-
ticular question is of this class.
In Dade County v. Philbrick,8 9 the supreme court was requested
to accept the following question for its consideration-"whether chapter
63-787, Laws of Florida, * * * is invalid and unconstitutional." This
statute vests those counties having a population in excess of 450,000 in-
habitants with exclusive authority to regulate ambulances. The court
declined to consider the question and in so doing stated: "We cannot
agree ... [that] the question, involving, as it does, only a limited locality
and a specific industry, is of great public concern." Accordingly, it may
be stated that in order for a question to be of great public concern, it




In general, a writ of prohibition will issue to correct errors of a court
which is 'acting outside the scope of its jurisdiction. It will not lie to
correct errors of a court which is acting within its jurisdiction, although
proceeding improperly in the exercise of that jurisdiction."' The latter
principle was applied to a situation where plaintiff, after taking a non-
suit, instituted a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.2 91
The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground of res
judicata was denied. The court expressly ruled that the practice of
taking a nonsuit was not abolished by the 1962 amendments. Because the
judgment in the first action did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to
proceed in the second action,9 2 prohibition was improper.
B. Mandamus
Keating v. State298 involved an appeal prosecuted by the Beverage
Director from an order granting a writ of mandamus which was brought
289. 162 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1964).
290. See 25 FLA. JuR., Principles Governing Issuance Generally § 6 (1960).
291. State v. White, 162 So.2d 697 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
292. Where two actions have been instituted involving the same parties and the
same subject matter, the general rule is that, upon the entry of a judgment in the
first action, remedy of prohibition is not available to prohibit further proceedings
in the second action. . . . This rule is based upon the fact that a judgment in the
first action does not, of itself, deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed in the
second action. Id. at 699.
293. 167 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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by a business competitor. At issue was whether the relator had sufficient
standing to seek and procure the writ. On February 7, 1962, a beverage
license issued to Gala Showplace was revoked with prejudice. The order
of revocation further provided that no license could be issued for that
location for a two year period commencing October 1, 1962. Prior to the
expiration of the two year period, the lessees of the premises sought and
obtained a modification of the order from one of revocation to suspension
without the two year prohibition period. Evidently, the order of modi-
fication was granted on the lessees' allegation that the premises had been
leased to Shell's Super Store, Inc. for use as a package store and that
Shell, upon the promise of being furnished a beverage license, had ex-
pended a considerable sum of money. Mandamus proceedings were
brought by a person who was both a citizen of the state and the operator
of a package store located one block from the premises in question. The
writ issued. On appeal, the first district held the relator had a sufficient
interest to seek and procure the writ.
A competitor is the one most likely to challenge the effect of an
unlawful act committed by an official purportedly acting under
the authority of law. The fact one is a competitor does not place
him in a different category from any other citizen. To hold
otherwise would in effect encourage the procurement of 'straw
men' to institute law suits rather than to permit interested
parties to insist that officials observe the law in carrying out
their administrative duies 94
C. Habeas Corpus
The use of habeas corpus to attack defective informations in criminal
cases has historically been a bothersome question in Florida jurispru-
dence. Judging from the decisions rendered during the period surveyed,
it continues to perplex members of the Florida Bar. In Ex parte Prince,29
it was early established that "where an indictment has been found which,
although subject to attack and overthrow upon demurrer, contains enough
to show that an offense has been committed of which the court has
jurisdiction, the party charged cannot be discharged on writ of habeas
corpus.. . ."I" This rule is valid today. In Buchanan v. State,2 97 a peti-
tion in habeas corpus was filed in the circuit court whereby the petitioner
contended that the information failed to state a crime. On appeal by the
state, the circuit court was held in error for issuing the writ; a crime
had been stated. The inquiry in the circuit court was limited to a deter-
mination ". . . as to whether the allegations of the information wholly
failed to state any offense under the laws of the State of Florida."
294. Id. at 50.
295. 27 Fla. 196, 9 So. 659 (1891).
296. Id. at 660.
297. 167 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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Habeas corpus proceedings are appropriate to determine the illegality
of a petitioner's restraint where it is due to a lack of jurisdiction over the
person or a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in the trial court.
However, "it is not a substitute for appeal and it cannot be invoked for
use in correcting mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a
trial court, no matter how flagrant, that are not jurisdictional and at most
would merely render a judgment voidable. '298
D. Certiorari
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Three types of certiorari proceedings exist in Florida-common law,
rule,299 and supreme court certiorari. Each operates within well defined
spheres and requirements applicable to each must be fulfilled before the
writ will issue. Whatever type of certiorari is employed, it must be
presented procedurally in accordance with the appellate rules. Rule
4.5(c)(6) prescribes the correct procedural steps to be followed in
presenting a petition for certiorari to the supreme court or district courts
of appeal.
At issue in Martorano v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 00 was the timeli-
ness of a petition filed sixty-one days after an order denying the peti-
tioner's application for an appeal was mailed. As formulated by the
third district, the question was whether the sixty day period allowed for
the filing of a petition commences to run from the date of mailing or
from some time thereafter. It should be noted that the applicable
statute' sanctioning review by certiorari of orders entered by the
Industrial Commission which deny applications for appeal does not pre-
scribe how or when such orders become "rendered." The court thus held
the instant petition to be timely, and reasoned that the "date of notice" is
the critical act. Moreover:
When notice of such an order is given by mailing, the date or
time of notice should be held to be some time after the mailing.
Three days should be allowed after actual mailing of the notice
making the date of notice and therefore the beginning of the
60 day period for certiorari, three days after the date of mail-
ing.302
As a general proposition, certiorari cannot be used to review purely
administrative action. However, administrative proceedings of a quasi-
298. Buchanan v. State, 167 So.2d 42, 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
299. Both common law and rule certiorari are exhaustively treated in 5 FLA. JUR.
Certiorari (1960).
300. 160 So.2d 744 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
301. FLA. STAT. § 443.07(e) (1963).
302. Martorano v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, supra note 300, at 746. Accord, New
York Ins. Co. v. Kurz, 174 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1965).
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judicial nature can be reviewed by certiorari. Accordingly, that provi-
sion of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County which prescribes for
review of any zoning resolution by certiorari is valid when review of an
interpretation and application of an ordinance by the Zoning Appeals
Board is sought.3 ° Before review of administrative proceedings can be
obtained by certiorari, however, the petitioner must first exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies. The point at which a petitioner has exhausted his
administrative remedies was at issue in Hoffman v. Board of Control."4
Petitioner, after being notified that his position with the University of
Florida would be abolished, appealed to a faculty committee. After the
committee rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner, a hearing was
sought and obtained before the Board of Control which resulted in an
affirmance of the order of the faculty committee. Petitioner then filed
a petition for review of the Board of Control with the State Board of
Education. However, before any action was taken on that petition, he
filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The appellate court refused to con-
sider the writ since petitioner had not exhausted available administrative
remedies. The Hoffman decision may be cited for the proposition that ad-
ministrative remedies are not exhausted until a decision is rendered by
the last administrative board sanctioned to rule upon the subject matter
of the cause. Merely invoking the jurisdiction of the last administrative
tribunal will not be sufficient.
2. COMMON LAW
The propriety of using common law certiorari was involved in
Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale.'05 Petitioner unsuccessfully contended
that the writ was appropriate because the circuit court; in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, upheld a conviction for which there was no
authority and accordingly deviated from essential requirements of the
law. The district court determined that jurisdiction was lacking. "[C] om-
mon law certiorari contemplates only an examination into the jurisdic-
tion of the courts below and the regularity of the procedural steps followed
and not a re-examination of the merits. , This is a principle of
early vintage.0 7
Prior to the entry of a final judgment at law, common law certiorari
may be used only if there is no full, adequate and complete remedy
available by appeal after final judgment. Except in these situations, to
permit certiorari prior to a final judgment would be tantamount to sanc-
tioning the use of the common law writ so as to "circumvent the rule of
303. Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. Dade County, 166 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
304. 172 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
305. 172 So.2d 867 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
306. Id. at 868.
307. The leading Florida case establishing this principle is Deans v. Wilcoxon, 18 Fla.
531 (1882), footnoted in 5 FLA. JiR. Certiorari, § 24, n.15 (1960).
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law which narrowly restricts the class of orders entered in a law action
which may properly be reviewed prior to the entry of final judgment in
the case." ' 8 In Girten v. Bouvier °9 and Van Devere v. Holmes,1 ° the
Second and Third District Courts of Appeal, respectively, were concerned
with determining the circumstances under which there could be said to
exist no adequate remedy available by appeal after final judgment. In the
latter case, an order directing a co-executor to produce original or
photostatic copies of all bank statements, cancelled checks, and deposit
slips concerning his trust account and further directing him to furnish any
other data which he may have or which he may be able to acquire
was held the proper subject matter for writ of common law certiorari.
The ratio decidendi of the decision was that the accounts to be examined
included privileged communications and that the order was too broad in
application. In Girten, petitioner sought review by common law certiorari
of the trial court's order which had sustained the plaintiff's objections to
the bulk of written interrogatories propounded by petitioner. The writ,
petitioner argued, was proper since plenary appeal would not afford
adequate remedy. This contention was supported by the following two
reasons: (1) the result of a successful appeal would merely result in a new
trial; and (2) the lack of information sought would cause him material
injury throughout the trial since it was essential to an effective preparation
of his case. The majority of the court held that these reasons did not
establish that substantial injury would result to the petitioner if he was
required to wait until plenary appeal could be brought. Judge Shannon
dissented on the ground that a prima facie case for the granting of the
writ was established.
3. RULE
Article V, section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution sanctions su-
preme court review by certiorari of interlocutory orders or decrees
entered in chancery which, upon final decree, are of the type which would
support a direct appeal to the supreme court. Clearly a chancellor's
order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend and expressly ruling
upon the constitutionality of a challenged statute fulfills those require-
ments. However, since Rule 4.2 sanctions review by interlocutory appeal
of non-final orders or decrees entered in equity, prior to the survey
period aggrieved parties had an option as to which method of review
they could utilize. In Gulf Fertilizer v. Walden,8 ' already dis-
308. Witten v. Howard Vernon Lodges & Rest., Inc., 169 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
The quoted matter accompanying note 305 of the text refers to the rule that interlocutory
appeals may be taken at law only from orders relating to venue or jurisdiction over the
person or from post decretal orders not relating to motions for new trial or reconsideration.
To permit certiorari at law as a means for reviewing orders from which no interlocutory
appeal could be taken would severely curtail this rule.
309. 155 So.2d 745 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
310. 156 So.2d 899 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
311. 163 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1964).
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cussed,812 the supreme court held that the proper method of review is
interlocutory appeal, not rule certiorari.
4. SUPREME COURT
Under Rule 4.5(c)(6), certiorari will lie to the supreme court to
review a decision of a district court of appeal that "is in direct conflict
with a decision of another district court of appeal or the Supreme Court
on the same point of law. .... 1113" In determining whether the requisite
conflict of decisions is present, the supreme court verbalizes the following
standard: The district court of appeal's decision must on its face collide
with another district court of appeal's decision or a prior supreme court
decision. 14 It has been held that a conflict of decisions rendered by the
same appellate court,315 or a conflict among a district court decision and
a Florida Statute318 will not support a writ of certiorari. Three decisions
decided during the surveyed period further refine the concept of "direct
conflict."
In Huguley v. Hall,'17 the district court's decision of which review
was sought consisted of the single word "Affirmed" and four case citations.
There was a dissenting opinion in which all the salient facts were set
forth. Initially, the supreme court viewed the decision as entirely
distinguishable from the standard per curiam affirmance and accordingly
granted the petition for certiorari. On reconsideration, the writ was dis-
charged because "petitioner . . . failed to establish that the instant
decision . . . is in direct conflict with the decision of another District
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court on the same point of law ....
The second decision rendered during the surveyed period, Wilcox
v. State,"9 stands for the proposition that the supreme court will not give
effect to inferences implicit in a decision in order to ascertain whether a
conflict exists. Nor will it scrutinize the facts of a decision to determine
what unannounced rule of law was applied in denying a motion for new
trial. The dissenting opinion 29 in Wilcox reveals that petitioner was
convicted of a felony under a statute prescribing that where the death of
another is "caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by any person
while intoxicated" the offender is guilty of manslaughter. The following
312. See pages 29-30 of text.
313. The textually discussed ground is but one of three grounds recognized by the Rule.
The two grounds not considered are where a decision of a district court of appeal (1) affects
a class of constitutional or state officers, and (2) passes upon a question certified by the
district court to be of great public interest. Fr. Apr. R. 4.5(c) (6).
314. See Kincaid v. World Ins. Co., 157 So.2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1963).
315. Grisillo v. Franklyn S. Inc., 173 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1965).
316. Pickman v. State, 164 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1964).
317. 157 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1963).
318. Id. at 418.
319. 171 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1965).
320. Judge Roberts was the dissenter.
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facts, established in the trial court, gave rise to the judgment of convic-
tion: the defendant was proceeding in an easterly direction following
a tractor trailer and the deceased was a passenger in a panel truck
proceeding in, the opposite direction. Fifteen or twenty minutes prior
to the accident, the defendant was stopped by a patrolman, but she was
permitted to proceed after some words were exchanged by the officer and
the defendant. The ill-fated accident occurred shortly after the defen-
dant's car and the tractor trailer passed a stretch in the highway narrow-
ing the traffic lanes from four in number to two. At that point, defendant's
care side-swiped the trailer "causing" the trailer to enter the lanes used
by on-coming traffic. After the criminal action was commenced against
the defendant, a tort action was brought against the driver of the trailer
truck which resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiffs. Before the verdict
and judgment in the civil action were entered, the criminal suit against
defendant was concluded. The judgment in the tort action establishing
the negligence of the trailer truck driver was entered while the de-
fendant's appeal in the criminal action was pending. A verified motion
was filed by the defendant requesting the appellate court to relinquish
jurisdiction to the trial court in order that an "Extraordinary Motion
for New Trial" could be presented in that court. In support of the
motion, defendant contended that "had the fact of the truck driver's
negligence been known at the time of the criminal trial, it would have
put an entirely different light upon the question whether the defendant's
alleged driving while intoxicated caused the death of the decedent." ''
The appellate court denied the motion without stating the reason for its
decision. The majority of the court, as previously noted, denied the
petition for writ of certiorari. Justice Roberts, in an exhaustive dissent,
viewed the lower court's order denying the motion for "new trial"
as establishing that "a person can lawfully be convicted of manslaughter
when it affirmatively appears, from the indictment itself, that the accused
did not perform the act from which the death of the deceased directly
resulted, and when it is judicially determined that the person who, in
effect, wielded the fatal blow . . . has committed an act or been guilty
of negligence which has operated as an efficient proximate cause of the
fatal blow." '22 This inference implicit in the lower court's order was
viewed by Judge Roberts as in direct conflict with a prior supreme court
decision establishing that the statute under which the defendant was
convicted requires that the death "be caused by the operation of a
motor vehicle. .. ."
Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, 23 a third noteworthy deci-
sion, recognizes an exception to the rule that a per curiam affirmance with-
out opinion will not support conflict certiorari. The exception recognized
obtains "where an examination of the record proper discloses that the
321. Supra note 319, at 886.
322. Id.
323. 176 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1965).
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legal effect of such per curiam affirmance is to create conflict with a
decision of [the supreme court] or another district court of appeal.Y324
Petitioner, defendant in the trial court, moved to quash service of process
made pursuant to sections 47.16 and 47.30 of the Florida Statutes.
Affidavits were filed by the parties in support of their respective positions.
Those of the petitioner averred that it "is a Michigan corporation with
an office in California and that in Florida it has never registered as a
foreign corporation, conducted business, owned or leased real estate,
appointed a resident agent, had a telephone listing, paid taxes, maintained
bank accounts or held stock, had any salesmen, officers or places of
business." '3 25 It did admit that petitioner manufactures a product 'in
Ohio which is sold and shipped in interstate commerce to independent
distributors or dealers for resale to customers. Respondent's affidavit
stated only that petitioner had informed respondent that its "nearest
distributor is . . . a Florida corporation with address in Miami." '326 From
a denial of petitioner's motion to quash made in the trial court, an
interlocutory appeal was taken to the third district which affirmed per
curiam the lower court's order. This order of affirmance was viewed by
the supreme court as constituting a "direct decisional conflict" with
another district court's decision which had held that "a plaintiff must
substantiate the jurisdictional allegations of a complaint in effecting
substituted service '. . . by affidavit containing statements of fact, or by
other proof.' 11327 Since the statement of facts referred only to statements
of material fact and respondent's affidavit lacked any material fact
clearly showing that petitioner was doing business in Florida, the conflict
requisite to support a writ of certiorari was apparent.
XVI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE I-ITS EFFECT
UPON OTHER REMEDIES
Criminal Procedure Rule No. I, patterned after title 28, section 2255,
of the United States Code was adopted in Florida in 1963. Since that
time, a significant number of cases have considered that Rule's effect
upon other remedies, both appellate and of an independent nature, that
previously were available in the state. It is the purpose of this section
to review some of the more important principles that have emerged from
those cases.
A. Rule I Compared with Appellate Review
Both functionally and theoretically, proceedings under Rule I and
appellate review differ. Fathered by the common law writ of coram nobis,
324. Id. at 904, quoted from Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So.2d 907 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965).
325. Id. at 905.
326. Id. at 905.
327. Id. at 905. The other district court of appeal decision referred to was Fawcett
Publications, Inc. v. Brown, 146 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1962).
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proceedings under Criminal Procedure Rule I are independent suits of a
civil nature brought in the court that committed the alleged error. Each
of these remedies operates within its own exclusive sphere.
In Lee v. State,82 based on two federal decisions, Smith v. United
States82 and Bowen v. United States,880 it was established in Florida that
"a collateral attack under Rule 1 proceedings may not be used to retry
issues or correct errors reviewable only upon direct appeal from the
conviction.1 331 To date, there is no rule of universal application which
clarifies which issues or errors are reviewable only upon direct appeal from
the conviction. For the most part, an examination of individual decisions
is necessary to clarify this point. Yet, the import of the distinction is
plain and accordingly practitioners are cautioned to carefully categorize
errors occurring during trial as to whether they are of the type reviewable
only by direct appeal or whether they may be asserted in an inde-
pendent action collaterally attacking the judgment. It is clear that where
the alleged errror falls within any one of the first three stated grounds in
the Rule, 82 relief under Rule I is appropriate. A different situation, how-
ever, is presented when the fourth and seemingly all encompassing
ground is considered: "For any other reason that the judgment is subject
to collateral attack." Because the time period within which a party can
seek relief under either of the remedies is different,838 failure to make
timely appeal when the alleged error can only be raised on direct appeal will
preclude all available relief. For example, in Harper v. State,8 4 the
appellant, some thirteen years after conviction, filed a motion to vacate
the sentence on the ground that he was denied equal protection by refusal
of the trial judge to furnish an official court reporter after he was advised
that defendant was financially unable to employ one. No appeal was
taken. Because the alleged error was reviewable only upon direct appeal
from the conviction, the collateral attack under Rule 1 would not lie.
B. What About Coram Nobis?
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the federal rules,
by their terms abolish the common law writ of coram nobis 8   There
328. 165 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
329. 252 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1958).
330. 260 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1958).
331. Harper v. State, 168 So.2d 325, 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
332. See the first paragraph of FLA. R. Ciwm. P. 1.
333. A motion for relief under Rule I can be made at any time so long as the defendant
is in custody under sentence of court. On the other hand, appeals prosecuted by a defendant
in criminal cases must be commenced within ninety days after the judgment has been entered.
See FLA. App. R. 6.2.
334. Supra note 336.
335. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b) provides:
Writs of coram nobis . . . are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment or decree shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action.
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recently has appeared, however, evidence that an independent action
based on the substantive law applicable to writs of coram nobis may be
utilized where relief under Rule 1 is not available for the reason that
the defendant is not in custody under sentence of court.3 6 In United
States v. Morgan,3 ' the analogous provision of the federal rules3 8 has
been construed to permit a motion in the nature of coram nobis in
criminal cases. Since the Florida rules are patterned after their federal
prototype, an independent action collaterally attacking a judgment of
conviction governed by the substantive law applicable to writs coram
nobis may also be an available procedural remedy in Florida. In view of
the fact that such an action may be proper in Florida, a procedural
distinction existing between the two should be noted.
Proceedings under Criminal Procedure Rule I do not require
that application be made in an appellate court for leave to
collaterally assail, in the trial court, a conviction and sentence
affirmed by the appellate court. Such leave is necessary to ap-
plication for coram nobis. 39
C. Rule I and Habeas Corpus
In general, a writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the applicant
has failed to exhaust his remedies under Criminal Procedure Rule 1.
Thus, where relief under Rule 1 was denied for the reason that the
record of the original trial showed that petitioner was represented by
counsel and no appeal from the orders denying relief was taken, relief
in habeas corpus was not available. 4 In a similar vein, a writ of habeas
corpus was not available where petitioner's appeal, taken after his
motions for hearing under Rule 1 were denied, was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction-the appeal was directed to the original judgment of
conviction and not to the adverse ruling of the trial court on the motion
under Rule 1. Relief by appealing the order denying the Rule 1 hearing
still remained. 41
An interesting situation was presented in Foxworth v. Wainwright,4 2
wherein habeas corpus was held appropriate. Petitioner, after his mo-
tion for a Rule 1 hearing was denied, filed an affidavit asserting
insolvency and by motion requested court appointed counsel to assist
in the appeal. An order denying the adjudication of insolvency and
336. See Grant v. State, 166 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), wherein the court stated:
"We need not nor do we decide if writ of error coram nobis would be available to one not
in custody and thus not able to invoke Rule I."
337. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
338. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
339. Solitro v. State, 166 So.2d 474 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
340. Gentry v. State, 172 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1965).
341. Gafford v. Wainwright, 157 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1963). Of course, the time for appeal-
ing must not have run in the interim.
342. 167 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1964).
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request for appointment of counsel was entered by the court. The clerk
of the trial court refused to file petitioner's notice of appeal without
payment of filing costs since there was no adjudication of insolvency. The
effect of these occurrences was to preclude appellate review of the order
denying the motion for a Rule 1 hearing since petitioner's appeal period
had expired in the interim. Under these circumstances, a writ of habeas
corpus was available. During the period surveyed, the First843 and
Second District Courts344 of Appeal have promulgated special rules
which, if followed, render unnecessary the use of habeas corpus under
the instant circumstances. Both courts provide:
No clerk of any trial court in this district from which an appeal
may be taken to this court from an order entered on a motion
for relief under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, shall require
the payment of any fee or any costs upon the filing of any such
notice of appeal, irrespective of whether or not the appellant
has been adjudged insolvent. 45
343. In re Internal Gov't. of the Dist. Ct. App., 156 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
344. In re Internal Gov't of the Dist. Ct. App., 156 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
345. Id. at 656.
